# 1NC

### Off

**Catastrophic environmental language causes reactive violence – it kills effective political action**

**Davidson, 2000** BioScience 50(5):433-440. 2000 Economic Growth and the Environment:Alternatives to the Limits Paradigm CARLOS DAVIDSON Carlos Davidson is a conservation biologist with a background in economics. He is currently studying landscape-scale patterns of amphibian decline in California in the Section of Evolution and Ecology, University of California, Davis

Is the limits metaphor a politically useful way to conceptualize environmental problems? If someone thinks that there is a cliff ahead in the road, she tells the driver, “There's a cliff.” If that is not sufficient, she says, “It is a big cliff and we all are going to die if we go over.” The limits approach assumes that “if only people understood” (i.e., saw the cliff and how big it is), they would stop their environmentally destructive practices (put on the brakes). After all, if the car crashes, everyone dies. All sane people are assumed to share a common interest in preventing a crash. The hope is that the existence and recognition of ecological limits external to society will force society to stop destructive practices. The limits perspective leads people to focus on pointing out limits and to emphasize the catastrophe that awaits if the limits are transgressed. As a consequence, writing about environmental degradation often has an apocalyptic tone. Environmentalists have often predicted impending catastrophes (e.g., oil depletion, absolute food shortages and mass starvation, or biological collapse). **This catastrophism is ultimately damaging to the cause of environmental protection. First, predictions of catastrophe, like the boy who cries wolf, at first motivate people's concern, but when the threat repeatedly turns out to be less severe than predicted, people ignore future warnings**. Secondly, the belief in impending catastrophe has in the past led some environmentalists to support withholding food and medical aid to poor nations (Hardin 1972), forced sterilization (Ehrlich 1968), and other **repressive measures**. Not only are these positions repulsive from a social justice perspective, they **also misdirect energy away from real solutions**. And, by blaming poor and third world people for global environmental problems, these views have tended to limit support for environmentalism to the affluent in the first world. Fortunately, environmentalists of widely differing political perspectives, including some leading limits thinkers, now see alleviating human misery and poverty as essential to solving global environmental problems (Athanasiou 1996, Daily and Ehrlich 1996, Ehrlich 1997). In addition to recognizing the need to address poverty and inequality, recent limits writing has reduced its focus on catastrophe. Historically, the limits metaphor has been part of a broader environmental and social analysis developed by authors such as Donella and Dennis Meadows, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, and Herman Daly. I refer to this broader analysis as the limits perspective. By focusing on aggregate quantities of natural resources, consumption, and population, the limits perspective **depoliticizes** our understanding of environmental destruction. What we consume, how much we consume, and how goods are produced are all political decisions that change over time and vary from country to country. Yet in the limits perspective, consumption and production technology are seen as more or less fixed, and significant social change is not even considered a possibility. In the most simplistic analyses, human population growth becomes the only variable in explaining environmental destruction. Similarly, many biologists who write on environmental issues erroneously apply the concept of carrying capacity to human society, and as a result ignore the social and political aspects of resource use. In animal populations, carrying capacity is the maximum population that can be sustained on the available resources in a given area. For human societies, however, carrying capacity has no real meaning unless consumption, technology, and a whole host of social variables are set at fixed levels (Cohen 1995). Viewing technology, consumption, and all social variables as fixed is implicit in the limits perspective, yet these variables are key to understanding the problem (Cohen 1995). For this reason, a recent high-profile statement of the limits perspective (Arrow et al. 1995) suggests moving away from the use of the carrying capacity concept.The environmental destruction that is decried by the limits perspective is often real, even if it does not result from a transgressed limit, but there is something missing from this perspective. The focus on the cliff and catastrophe means that important political questions are often not asked: Why are we driving so fast? Who benefits from driving in this manner? Who has the right to decide how we drive and why? What views and beliefs support the current arrangements? Who benefits least from the current arrangements and might support change?

**The alternative is to reject the apocalyptic framing of the 1AC**

**Alt solves – clears space for environmental paradigms not grounded in apocalypticism – that’s key to reclaiming political space from the right**

**Buell 3** (Frederick, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books, From Apocalypse To Way of Life, pages 185-186)

If ecoterrorism, ecocentrism, and the wilderness tradition clearly provided the right with ways to **invalidate** and disunify environmentalism, so did targeting environmental crisis. But there was a difference. The power that crisis elaboration had to mobilize a wide variety of people on a wide variety of societal, urban, and technological as well as nature-based issues made it the most important **target** of attempts to **discredit environmentalism** and divide environmentalists. Ecoterrorism was easy to condemn, and nature purism easy to satirize; both, however, involved limited constituencies. Environmentalism’s discourse of crisis, bolstered by science as well as sentiment, was by contrast much more difficult to dismiss. At the same time, it was the most necessary to delegitimize: its constituency was the largest and most various, and it was the environmental discourse that offered the most forceful and telling critique of industrial capitalism. Thus by the end of the 1970s, environmentalists were regularly and extravagantly vilified as **pathological crisis-mongers**, Chicken Littles, apocalypse abusers, false prophets, joyless, puritannical doomsters, chic- apocalyptic neoprimitives, sufferers from an Armageddon complex, and toxic terrorists: calling them this in serious social analysis and on talk-back radio alike, as noted above, became a big business. Also as noted above, the elaboration of **counterscience became a well-funded** and widespread enterprise. Under this withering fire, fault lines appeared among environmental advocates and theorists. Theodore Roszak was far from alone in deciding that crisis elaboration meant doomsterism and was thus a political liability for environmentalism. And other more academic writers, such as the Marxist geographer David Harvey, found philosophical and theoretical as well as important political reasons for dispensing with the discourse of crisis, a discourse he unsympathetically characterized as the “millenarian and apocalyptic proclamation that ecocide is imminent.”59 And if, for Roszak, Harvey, and others, crisis talk was retrograde and to be dispensed with, new environmental paradigms and theories were needed to fill the gap. The result was not a reconception of crisis in the face of new political circumstances but a jettisoning of crisis in favor of new environmental-political paradigms, ones crafted to take its place.

### Off

#### Natural gas prices high now- glut being drained

Day and Fitzgerald 3/18 (Matt Day And Drew Fitzgerald, Wall Street Journal, “Natural-Gas Futures Touch 16-Month High on Continued Cold Weather”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324323904578368261349032602.html>, March 18, 2013)

NEW YORK--Natural-gas futures soared to their highest price since October 2011 as investors bet that cold March weather would boost demand for the heating and power-plant fuel. The late-winter chill across most of the country has stirred demand for gas-fired heating at a time of year when temperatures typically climb and natural-gas use falls. Stockpiles of the fuel have dwindled at a faster-than-expected pace, reducing the odds that a glut would form later this year. Preliminary reports also suggest that drillers are throttling back on production, almost a year after concerns about too much supply pushed prices to decade lows. The winter season is coming to an end and the energy market readies for a slowdown in the need for heating fuels, but natural gas prices are up by 9%. MarketWatch's Jim Jelter discusses why demand for natural gas will increase in the future. (Photo: Getty Images) "We've been waiting for supply to sort of turn over," said Teri Viswanath, director of commodities strategy at BNP Paribas BNP.FR -1.72% . "This may be a sign that we've finally reined in our shale-gas growth." Natural gas for April delivery climbed as high as $3.965 a million British thermal unit in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. That was the highest intraday level since Oct. 31, 2011. The front-month contract gave back some of those gains, ending 1 cent, or 0.3%, higher at $3.882/mmBtu. The rise brings relief to natural-gas drillers that have been battered by low prices. Coal-mining companies are also cheering, as increasingly expensive natural gas means utilities may return to the competing power-plant fuel. For consumers, a sustained rally in natural gas could lead to higher home-heating and electricity bills down the line. The rally comes as U.S. gas stockpiles, which hit all-time highs this time last year, have fallen by wider-than-normal amounts for five straight weeks, surprising analysts and traders who expected to exit the high-demand winter-heating season with plenty of gas in storage. In past years, late-winter rallies have fizzled when falling demand caused stockpiles to quickly build. A late-winter chill across most of the country is pushing up natural-gas prices. Above, a man shovels a Brooklyn sidewalk this month. "The size of the withdrawals that we've seen over the past month or so have really given prices the 'oompf' they need" to rally, Schneider Electric SU.FR -0.39% energy consultant Matt Smith said. Gas output from the lower 48 U.S. states fell 1.1% in December, the biggest month-on-month drop since February 2012, according to data from the Energy Information Administration. Falling stockpiles and production have turned speculators bullish on natural gas. Money managers such as hedge funds last week held more bets that natural-gas futures prices would rise than bets they would decline for the first time since November, according to data from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

#### Renewables lower natural gas prices- reduce demand

PR Newswire ‘12 (2012, <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/new-national-study-shows-efficiency-and-renewables-can-provide-immediate-relief-from-high-natural-gas-prices-71038257.html>, “New National Study Shows Efficiency and Renewables Can Provide Immediate Relief from High Natural Gas Prices, September 8, 2012)

New investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy generation could begin lowering natural gas prices immediately and help retain manufacturing jobs, a study prepared by the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) released today shows. The Energy Foundation (EF) commissioned ACEEE to prepare the study, Impacts of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy on Natural Gas Markets, to determine whether efficiency and renewables would produce significant price reductions and cost savings by reducing demand for natural gas. "This study shows that we can quickly reduce wholesale natural gas prices 10-20 percent and save consumers over $75 billion in the next five years," stated David Wooley, Vice President of the Energy Foundation. "The fastest, surest way to give gas and electricity consumers relief from spiking energy prices is to enact state and federal policies to expand renewable power generation and to help consumers install more efficient electric and gas appliances, heating and cooling systems." Specific policy solutions outlined in the study include: update state and federal appliance efficiency standards; require electric utilities to use more renewable power generation; expand rebates and grants to consumers to improve equipment efficiency and install clean on-site power generation; expand federal research and development support for emerging efficiency and renewable generation technologies; and establish tax credits for efficiency and renewable energy investments. "The study, which is based on a scientific analysis of natural gas markets, outlines the specific benefits that energy efficiency and renewables would provide to our economy by reducing the high energy costs borne by consumers and industry," explained Dr. Neal Elliott, Industry Program Director at ACEEE and co-author of the study. "Contrary to what many are saying, there is something we can do about natural gas prices right now. Increased efficiency and renewable energy can reduce natural gas prices quickly and affordably." According to the study, lower natural gas prices and consumption would save consumers $15 billion/year nationally from 2004 to 2008 for cumulative savings of over $75 billion over the next five years. This translates into an average residential household savings of $96 per year on natural gas bills. Additional savings would occur from lower electricity bills. "Along with a robust and diverse supply of energy, increased efficiency is clearly a critically important component of our response to the natural gas crisis," said Peter Molinaro, Dow's Vice President of Government Affairs. "Affordable and available natural gas is critical to the health of American industry, our economy, and the environment. Leaders in the public and private sector need to do everything they can to spur investment in more efficient insulation, appliances, motors, heating and cooling systems, lighting, and clean on-site generation." An increasing share of the electricity generated in the U.S., particularly in the Northeast, South, and on the West Coast, comes from natural gas-fired power plants. The analysis shows that natural gas expenditures by electric power generators would decrease by $6.2 billion in 2004 and by as much as $10.4 billion by 2008. This reduction in natural gas expenditures would reduce electricity rates in these regions, an additional benefit for electric power consumers. ACEEE's Elliott noted that rapidly rising gas prices are forcing industries to close or move production to other countries. The study shows that higher levels of energy efficiency and renewable energy would stem this decline. He added, "Energy efficiency and renewable energy investments help employment in the manufacturing sector because they reduce natural gas prices and help preserve U.S.-based jobs that rely on natural gas as a manufacturing feedstock. They also create substantial numbers of jobs in construction, installation, and component manufacturing." Natural gas is used as a fuel and raw material for a wide range of products including fertilizer, plastics, chemicals, and steel. In the wake of the northeastern blackout in August, Wooley of the Energy Foundation said that the policies that help reduce energy prices are consistent with steps needed to avoid future electric system failures. "Energy efficiency and distributed renewable generation lower peak demand on the electric transmission system and reduce the risk of system failures. They make our electric supply more secure without increasing our dependence on fossil fuel imports."

#### Causes Russian lashout- nuclear war

Mckillop ’12 - an energy and natural resource sector economist; consultant; held posts in the Canada Science Council, the ILO, European Commission, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and South Pacific, and the World Bank (McKillop, Andrew. “Waiting For Russia And Saudi Arabia: Crude Oil Prices Will Fall”. June 26, 2012. http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article35327.html)

It however sets the real panic-price level for Saudi Arabia and Russia, and identifies why they will take avoiding action much further up the price scale: from US$75 per barrel. Especially for Russia, where OAO Gazprom is beginning to map the contours of its coming decline - rather than looking at the future, not liking it, and saying it doesn't exist - falling oil prices and falling gas prices can deliver a hard blow to the Putin Empire. This could possibly be to the extent of "tweaking" the tail of the Russian bear by one turn too much, making it especially aggressive. Saudi Arabia's oil price sensitivity, claimed by Saudi braggers to be so low it doesn't exist, has climbed so high and far from the long-dead days of Saudi claims that it can live with oil at $35, that figures near US$60 or even 70 per barrel can be taken seriously. Plenty of other OPEC states, measuring their oil price sensitivity relative to their national budgets, debt servicing, and oil sector development financing, are right up at the $75 plimsoll line. Facing the producers however, the world's biggest oil consumer, the US is now sitting on more oil supplies than it has had since 1990. This coincides with the US having its weakest oil demand for 15 years - and at most only fractional growth prospects. Other OECD oil consumers are using ever less oil, especially the European group which is showing its sixth year of oil demand contraction at a 6-year average rate of 2.5% each year. To be sure this is powerfully driven by recession, but is also aided by growing energy efficiency and accelerating changes in the energy economy, shown by the ever growing GDP output from each barrel that is spent or used. Another acid test for "the right price" of oil is coming from the trader community itself: in highly predictable fashion, the slump in oil prices has coincided with a steep selloff in oil futures contracts over the last three months. According to the US market watchdog agency the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) speculators have cut their net-long positions—their bets that the price will rise—to the equivalent of 136 million barrels of oil, the lowest since September 2010, and the exact opposite to the vast binge of speculative buying that preceded. At the time, things were good for net-long speculators: there was still some mileage in the Iran nuclear crisis, despite its antique status, but above all global oil demand seemed to be recovering. The result was a six-month bull run that is now history. With the speculators out of the market, prices will tend to more easily reflect supply-demand fundamentals, not a screen shot from Goldman Sach's trading programs, with the near certain readout that oil prices can or should decline all through summer. That however depends on how fast and how far price fall this summer. SAUDI AND RUSSIAN REARGUARD ACTION Current price trends are already running faster than market analysts and gurus cared to imagine, with many of their forecasts still set at Brent prices softening to around US$90 per barrel by September, and West Texas Intermediate possibly falling to as low as US$80 by the same date. Saudi and Russian reaction will therefore tend to be jumpstarted by prices softening faster than predicted. The unlikely alliance and unholy (or uncoranic) couple of Russia and KSA will almost certainly and quite rapidly be squealing. Their fears are easy to understand: nothing particularly prevents oil prices slumping to US$60 per barrel - consumers would find no special problems in accepting oil at that price, even if the economic benefits of cheap oil have been drastically exaggerated for decades. Cheap oil is in fact a producer problem, not a consumer problem, and both of the strange couple have problems. Of the two biggest producers, Russia has the largest problems accepting prices much below $75 per barrel and staying there. A big cut in its oil revenues at a time when gas prices are under sure and certain threat - if a couple of years ahead - and commodity prices outside the energy sector are set to decline, spells big trouble for Russia's national finances, the economy, and Putin's now troubled and contested leadership. For Russia, a Middle East conflagration of the type that his favourite local dictator, Bashr el Assad is threatening would be a welcome oil price booster. Defending el Assad will be an interesting test for Putin: if he lets the war criminal drop, oil prices will soften even further.

### Off

#### Our interpretation for debate is that we should maximize the three hours we have together

#### To maximize the three hours we have together, three preconditions must be met ---- The affirmative’s failure to advance these 3 pre-requisites undermines debate’s transformative and intellectual potential

#### 1. Two teams oppose sides- the affirmative has the burden of proof to prove a change from the status quo in direction of the resolution and the negative has the burden of rejoinder (conflict-based scenario)

#### 1. Debate should have a voted-on resolution that is established prior the debate (knowledge aspect)

#### 2. Each side has equal times to speaking in the debate (game resources)

Harr et al 8, Rasmus Harr (IT University of Copenhagen, Center for Computer Games Research, Copenhagen, Denmark), Tasha Buch (School of Education, University of Aarhus, Department for Educational Anthropology, Copenhagen, Denmark), Thorkild Hanghøj (University of Southern Denmark, Department of Media Science, Odense, Denmark), “Exploring the discrepancy between educational goals and educational game design,” 2008, http://www.itu.dk/people/rasmusharr/08\_05%20ECGBL\_paper\_final.doc

According to Jan Klabbers, the study of educational games (i.e. simulations and video games) stems from different research traditions (Klabbers 2006). Thus, we need a broad, cross-disciplinary conceptualization of educational games, which can be accepted by different disciplines that all have different criteria for validating knowledge. In order to solve this epistemological problem, Klabbers draws upon the social anthropologist Frederick Barth’s theory on the anthropology of knowledge, which can be used to describe different “traditions of knowledge” (Barth 2002: 3). For Barth, a tradition of knowledge can be defined analytically in relation to a substantive corpus of assertions, a range of media and representations, and a social organisation (Barth 2002). Based upon this framework, Klabbers argues that a game embeds assertions and ideas about the world in three ways: In the rule-base of the game, in the resources of the game, and in the players and their knowledge. Game media of representation include game boards, papers, pencils, multimedia computers etc. Similarly, games are distributed, communicated, employed, and transmitted within particular social institutions – i.e. large organisations or school settings (Klabbers 2006: 71). The three aspects of knowledge (assertions, representations, social organisation) are interconnected and determine each other mutually (Klabbers 2006: 72, Barth 2002: 3). This dynamic resembles Gee’s notion of semiotic domains defined by distinct forms of “content”, literacies, and social practices, which can be designed to engage and manipulate people in certain ways (Gee 2003: 43 ff). The point here is that any tradition of knowledge – i.e. educational games or teaching practices – generates tradition-specific criteria for validating knowledge. In order to understand the relationship between educational games and educational goals, we wish to concentrate on how educational games are played within the formal context of classroom settings. Thus, the knowledge aspects of gaming can be compared with the knowledge aspects of teaching (Jank & Meyer 2006). See table 1 below:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Knowledge aspect** | **Teaching** | **Gaming** |
| Assertions | Educational goals, content, norms, and values | Conflict-based scenario with roles, rules, and goals |
| Modes of representation | Teacher-pupil dialogue and available learning resources | Realisable resources (depends upon particular game format/genre) |
| Social organisation | Organisation of teaching and learning activities | Realisation of game assertions and resources |

Table 1: Teaching and gaming as dual traditions of knowledge

Obviously, the different knowledge aspects of gaming and teaching are not to be seen as “equal” entities as they are based upon different ontologies and different intentions. Instead, the purpose of the table above is to provide an analytical framework that makes it possible to understand the complex relationship between gaming practices and teaching practices. Thus, the parameters listed in the table may be used to promote further research and discussions on the design and use of educational games. However, for the purpose of this paper, we merely wish to focus on the relationship between educational games and educational goals within the context of classroom settings. We believe that this focus should be a crucial concern for educational game researchers. Thus, there exists an abundance of theory on educational games, but there are relatively few empirical studies of whether or how educational games are able to realise their intended educational goals (Klabbers 2006, Sefton-Green 2006, van Eck 2007).

2.1. A socio-cultural approach to game-based learning

A meta-theory on educational gaming should not be limited a priori to any particular learning theory. Rather, we believe that the choice of learning theory for understanding educational games must depend upon actual research questions, the knowledge aspects of a given game and the educational goals, which the game intends to help the player/pupil to fulfil. As we wish to focus on the players/pupils’ own experience of playing educational games within a formal school setting, we believe that a socio-cultural approach provides a valuable theoretical framework (Linderoth 2004, Hanghøj in press). Thus, in this paper, we will not include perspectives on cognitive an d constructivist learning processes. However, before presenting our assumptions of game-based learning in more detail, we will first describe the faces of knowledge embedded in the educational video game Global Conflicts: Palestine game design and its intended educational goals.

2.2. Global Conflicts: Palestine as an anthropology of knowledge

On the game website, GC: P is described as a 3D role-playing simulation game, “which gives the chance to explore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict first-hand” (http://learning.seriousgames.dk/learn-more.aspx, last visited 28-05-2008). The game is targeted at pupils of the age of 12+ in relation to school subjects such as citizenship, history, and media studies. The game lets the player take on the role as a freelance journalist who is sent on various news assignments by an editor. These consists of doing research in order to write an article by walking around in the 3D environment and “interviewing” different sides of the conflict through the acquisition of “quotes”. The quotes are then used for putting together a newspaper article. Before going out to interview people on each assignment, the player will have to choose which newspaper to write for – an Israeli, a Palestinian, or a European newspaper. Having chosen a news angle the player will experience the difficulty of getting enough information from all sides of the story when researching different sides of the conflict: If the player chooses either the Israeli or Palestinian newspaper, the opposite part will be hesitant to deliver information. Similarly, if the player has chosen the more balanced European newspaper then people from both the Israeli and Palestinian side will be suspicious. When a mission is accomplished, the player calls the editorial office, and by making use of the collected quotes, the player constructs an article with a headline and illustrating pictures. The goal is to accomplish as high a news value in the article as possible. This is done by finding as good quotes as possible.

According to the website of Serious Games Interactive (SGI), the company behind GC: P, the game themes include human rights, terrorism, and the role of media. Furthermore, the game is intended to teach the pupils specific skills and competences in terms of critical thinking in relation to news sources, being able to write an article as well as the appreciation of different perspectives on the ideological conflict. In order to achieve these educational goals, the game is intended to support the pupils’ learning processes through a series of motivating elements by providing a safe, engaging, and realistic environment.

If we look at the knowledge aspects in this educational game, there are certain values embedded in educational intentions of the game and in the actual game design as it is realized in the classroom. Thus, the game is a 3D single-player role-playing game created for use in formal educational environments for teaching citizenship, history, and media. Consequently, the assertions, modes of representation, and the social organization around the game are very much dictated by the formal educational environment of a school, a classroom, pupils, a teacher, and perhaps an IT-room.

2.3. Turning meta-theory into an analytical tool

In order to couple our meta-theory of educational games to the analysis of GC: P, we will apply perspectives from multimodal theory (Kress 2001). Briefly put, multimodal theory seeks to extend the linguistic origins of social semiotics to include sound, visual images and other forms of representation in order to show how different modalities of communication are combined in different kinds of media. This perspective is especially targeted at the design and use of digital media, which plays a large role in contemporary forms of communication and education (Kress 2001, Kress 2005, Jewitt 2008). Thus, multimodal theory is highly relevant for our analysis of the various modalities embedded within the 3D role-playing environment of GC:P..

One of the central assumptions in multimodal theory is that modalities are not equally suited to fulfil particular semiotic purposes. In order to explore the relationship between modality and purpose, Kress adapts Gibson’s notion of “affordance” (Gibson 1979, Kress 2005). Thus, for Kress, affordance refers to “distinct potentials and limitations for representation of the various modes” (Kress 2005: 12). This means that teachers and pupils tend to act differently, when presented with different modalities and their respective affordances. On the other hand, it is not possible to predict exactly how different teachers and pupils will respond to the affordances of different modalities (Prior 2005).

The main point here is that it is possible to understand the educational potential of a video game by performing an empirical analysis that compares the intentions of the game design and the actual realisation of game design. Burn and Carr have presented a model for analysing video games via multimodal theory (Burn 2003). According to this model, it is possible to identify three different areas of motivation for meaning-making processes in relation to game designs. These areas include: ludic motivations (strategy, goals, skills acquisition, exploration, rules), representational motivations (dramatic, narrative, performative aspects) and communal motivations (the game’s generic identity and wider digital culture).

2.4. Choosing a learning theoretical framework

As suggested by GC:P’s self-description, the game intends to facilitate learning processes, which feature an active learner that experiments and explores different perspectives through critical thinking. Thus, we believe that John Dewey’s theory of inquiry-based learning is a suitable theory for describing the intended learning goals and processes of the game (Dewey 1916, 1933). According to Dewey, pupils learn by inquiring into particular problems through a continual construction and re-construction of experience-based forms of knowledge. Inspired by Dewey, James Paul Gee presents this as a four-stage process, where the player: 1) probes a virtual world, 2) forms a hypothesis based upon reflections, 3 reprobes the game world with that hypothesis in mind, and 4) treats the feedback from the game world through rethinking of his/her original hypothesis (Gee 2003: 90).

Analogous to his theory of inquiry-based learning, Dewey used the metaphorical image of a "dramatic rehearsal" to describe how individuals make moral and ethical decisions by a playing through of “various competing possible lines of action" in their mind (Dewey 1922: 190). Thus, when pupils enter the scenario of GC:P, they must explore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a journalist's perspective and interview the characters within the game world by playing through and enacting different moral and strategic choices in relation to their journalistic aims and the game characters' assigned norms and values.

3. Empirical study

In this section, we will present GC: P through the lens of a multimodal analysis, which relates the designed intentions of the game scenario to teachers and pupils’ perceptions of the realised game. This analysis does not represent a finished analysis, but consists of selected examples in line with the goal of this paper, which is to explore and discuss the discrepancy between the intentions of educational games and realised educational goals.

3.1. Setup

In this pilot study, GC:P was used in a simple 1 ½ hour set-up with a 9th grade (15-16 years of age), who played the news assignment “Military Raid”. The empirical findings consist of observations from the setup, combined with post-game interviews with the teacher and 8 pupils. The school was a lower secondary Danish public school in the economically well-to-do suburbs North of Copenhagen with a group of pupils that were relatively culturally homogenous. Furthermore, the school has a strong ICT-profile, as ICT is embedded in many activities of the everyday school life.

3.1.1. Building the newspaper article in GC: Palestine

Our empirical findings focus on the article writing and quote-system in GC:P. Thus, we will briefly describe how these work in the game. When a player has finished his or her collection of quotes via the in-game “interviews” the player calls in the article to “the editorial office”. Here there is a shift from the 3D world to a 2D article platform, where the player builds the article using the quotes taken during the interviews. As figure 1 shows the article platform is divided in two parts: An article template in the left of the screen and, to the right side of the screen, three categories with three possible options of which the article is build: headlines, notes and pictures. The headlines present three different political value sets: the Israeli perspective, the Palestinian perspective and the balanced perspective. The player must then choose the right headline that fits with the political angle of the article. Choosing one of three pictures to illustrate the content is optional.

Figure 1: Article template and feedback section in Global Conflicts: Palestine (SGI, 2007) April 2008.

Finally, the player selects three quotes out of the maximum of 15 quotes from the virtual notebook and place these three quotes as ‘head text’, ‘body text’ or ‘sub text’. Each quote is evaluated on its news value (see figure 1, left picture). At the bottom of the right side of the screen information is shown on the status of the article (total news value of the article and an Israeli/Palestinian alignment status on article level) and the status of the player progression (‘intern’, ‘apprentice’ and ‘reporter’-level and an Israeli/Palestinian alignment status on player level). When the article is constructed, the player sends it to the in-game newspaper office by pressing the submit button. Then a piece of evaluating text pops up explaining the editor’s perception of the article and its final placement in the newspaper (see figure 1, right picture).

3.2. Empirical findings

The preliminary analysis of the empirical data from the pilot study is primarily based upon observations and post-game interviews with selected pupils and the teacher, as well as the director of SGI behind GC: P. In the post-game interviews with the pupils, two main analytical themes on the article template emerged. The first theme concerns the structural design of the article template, while the second regards the perception of the quantitative versus qualitative evaluation of the quotes when “writing” the article.

Examining the first point, the pupils found the absence of syntactic coherence between the quotes in the article template to be quite problematic:

Pupil B: “It doesn’t really fit together as an article, and maybe that doesn’t matter, because afterwards you don’t need the article. But when there are three quotes and a picture, and there is no other text… well, I think it was difficult to make it fit together.”

Questioner: “You mean that the quotes didn’t fit in a verbal sense?”

Pupil B: “Yes, if there are three different points of views, and they are not really tied together, if you haven’t played the game yourself, right. If you just saw those three quotes, you would think ’what do these have to do with each other?’ They have something to do with each other, but it is quite difficult to show, when there is no…”

Questioner: [interrupts] “For other people to understand?”

Pupil B: “Yes, exactly.”

(Pupil focus group interview, no. 1, 10/04/2008)

It was a general experience among the pupils that the quotes in the article template were mutually incoherent, and therefore not tied together. Also, the meaning of the quotes was stripped from the context in which they were taken. In this way, it was difficult for the pupils to grasp the overall meaning of the article. Furthermore, many pupils were frustrated that they had no control over the composition of the text. This lack of control meant that they were not able to communicate and make other people understand the work they had been doing within the game. Thus, the pupils were more interested in the article as a product, which could be shown to others, instead of merely using the output for their own evaluation.

This leads us to the second point, which concerns the pupils’ need for qualifying the content of the article with their own personal conceptions of the context in a mission. Here they are asked for comments on the article platform:

Pupil B: “I just think that you should make the judgment yourself instead of the computer.”

Questioner: “Would that be nice if you could do that yourself?”

Pupil B: “It would be more interesting, because concerning this selection, you would discover ’okay, this is good’ or ’oh well, it isn’t, anyway’, then it is one’s own opinion when it is yourself writing the newspaper. And of course you would go after making it your own, but then again, you also wanted the best evaluation.”

Pupil A: “But there are only statements and quotes from the people, you didn’t report anything yourself at all.”

Pupil C: “There could have been some options where you could be able to write something yourself. (…)”

Questioner: “It could have been nice if this option was available?”

Pupil A: “Well, maybe that would have been more journalistic, or more right.”

Pupil C: “It would have been more personal, if you could express your own opinion, you could say.”

(Pupil focus group interview no. 2, 10/04/2008)

As this excerpt suggests, the pupils expressed a need for being able to evaluate the quotes and write the content in the article template themselves. Thus, the game content could be more interested if the pupils were allowed to evaluate and actually write as this would allow them to discover their own limits. Arguably, this feature could also create opportunities for critical thinking and re-construction of knowledge. Instead, the pupils’ response suggests that the players’ current possibilities for recognising his/her knowledge deficiencies are rather blurred.

Furthermore, the pupil’s lacking sense of self-control over the “interviews” with in-game characters and the imitated “writing” process were seen as problematic. Instead, they saw the possibility for actually writing a text within the game design as a motivational and challenging aspect in itself. The pupils also pointed out that more self-control over the text in the article template would add more realism to the journalist role. The teacher supports this interpretation in a separate interview, when describing her reflections on how the pupils’ reacted on playing GC:P.

“The pupils complained that they were able to figure it out in some way, when it [the quote] has a high news value. They were disappointed that it was ‘laid out on the table’. It would have been nice if they had to think for themselves, and then afterwards they could see whether it had news value or not, or more alignment, or what it was.”

(Teacher interview 10/04/2008, our markings)

The teacher would clearly value teaching her pupils critical and independent thinking. She would several times use the phrase “using the brain” during the play session and debriefing with the pupils, which, to her, represents the core of critical thinking. These findings points to a general discussion about quantitative and qualitative approaches to the acquisition of knowledge and cognitive skills. As suggested by an interview, the game designers are fully aware of this discussion:

“If you consider it structurally, then the problem is that an… an interpretation or a good quote is a subjective consideration, which is very difficult to quantify and operationalise. And that is what we try to do. Structurally it will always cause trouble. Because a pupil could think ’I could use this quote in this way’, and if we [Serious Games Interactive] didn’t think it that way, so to say. Or if the pupil has a particular qualification or a special background, which means that he/she is able to see certain things. And you could say that the pupil would get punished for this qualification if it doesn’t fit with the logic of the game.”

(interview with CEO Simon Egenfeldt-Nielsen, SGI 08/04/2008)

Another empirical finding we find worth mentioning is that the actual dialogue between the pupils working in pairs was reduced to pointing at the screen followed by short exclaims. These exclaims would be ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘pick that one’, concerning the dialogue text on which the pupils were to take a stand as they were playing the journalist role. Furthermore, the dialogue between pupils and teacher was mostly reduced to questions about strategies of the journalist role or technical problems. The rich amount of text in dialogues between the journalist and the informants of a mission made the pupils attention cling to the screen as they had to read the text before being able to make a choice.

4. Educational goals versus game elements

In this section, we wish to discuss the discursive modes that are represented in the structural composition of the quote system and the article template. As the empirical findings suggest, the pupils’ learning experience was closely linked with the game representations for selecting quotes and editing the article. Furthermore, the pupils’ lack of control of the composition made it impossible for them to express their own interpretations of what they had grasped as relevant information from the game missions.

In summary, both teachers and pupils’ questioned the lack of a more engaging and self-dependent form of participation in the game, which could involve actual writing –in contrast to mere imitation of journalistic writing. According to the teacher, this would allow the pupils to “think for themselves’”. Based upon the current game design, it is questionable whether the article template and the quote system is able to support critical thinking as it is mainly the game system that decide for the pupils. This point towards a gap between the teacher’s and the pupils’/players’ understanding of critical thinking on one side, and the game designer's promises of critical thinking as one of the educational goals of the game on the other side.

When analyzing GC: P from a multimodal discourse analytical perspective, there appears to be a discrepancy between the “learning discourse” of the game and the actual design stratas of the game (Kress 2001). Thus, the educational goals of the game states that pupil should be able to learn about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whereas the design is mainly centred on the game elements and game goals, which allow pupils/players to learn and act as a journalist. According to the response from teachers and pupils, the journalist role seems to be stealing the focus from the content of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This discrepancy is supported by the “reward” system of the game, which allows pupils to score points that measure the “trust” of the Israelis and Palestinians.

Furthermore, the game representations raise certain expectations among the pupils, which influence the affordances of the perceived signs within the game environment. Following Burn and Carr’s analytical model described earlier, we will argue that the 3D aesthetics of the role-playing/adventure game genre (representational motivation) promises inquiry-based exploration and challenge within the game world (ludic motivation) (Burn 2003, Dewey 1916). The representational motivations are further linked with the genre-specific expectations (communal motivation) raised by the game design as it both refers to the practices of real-life news journalists and the pupils’ familiarity with video games as such. However, the players’ choices within the game (i.e. having dialogues with different characters, getting qusotes, and creating articles) are basically founded upon the logics of multiple choice. Thus, playing the game creates a discrepancy between the representational/communal motivations and the ludic motivations of the game. This discrepancy was a recurring theme in the post-game interviews, where the pupils were disappointed that they could not produce their own articles – which would fulfil their expectations toward the role of a “journalist”. Thus, the pupils were only able to imitate the process of “writing an article”.

From the game designer’s perspective, this discrepancy makes sense, since, as the quote mentioned in section above illustrates, it is very hard to quantify the “news value” of a quote in a meaningful way. Thus, the individual pupil found it difficult to understand the premises for this quantitative form of evaluation as it is not backed by any arguments or explanations. In this empirical study, it seemed that the pupils’ comprehension of their game experience was mainly focused on: 1) the logic of the game system’s evaluation of the quotes, 2) whether a point-of-view represents one or the other stance, and/or 3) trying to figure out the cohesion between the quotes. However, instead of promoting critical thinking, the actual process of composing the article ends up being a drill-and-practice exercise, where the pupils simply click through the different quotes.

5. Discussion

The aim of this paper is to open a crucial discussion about the discrepancy between the intentions of educational game designs and realised educational goals. Unfortunately, the empirical aspects of this problem seems to be somewhat neglected among educational games researchers, who prefer to spend time discussing exciting new theories or design details within the safe environment of their separate “ghettos”. In order to provide a common ground for this discussion within and across these different ghettos, we propose that Barth’s/Klabbers’ meta-theoretical framework can be used to understand and compare how the knowledge aspects of educational games and educational gaming in terms of assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Barth 2002, Klabbers 2006, Hanghøj in press).

In our pilot study of GC:P, we found that there was a clear discrepancy between educational game elements versus educational goals, or between “means” and “ends” as Dewey would term it (Dewey 1916). This leads to a broader discussion on whether it is meaningful to use computers for evaluating learning processes. If we look at what areas in which educational games have been commercially successful (i.e. the military, health care, disaster prevention, management, and financial simulations), it seems obvious that video games offer a relevant way of evaluating learning that occurs within closed systems, and where the learning goals are related directly to understanding this system (Klabbers 2006). For more context-dependent learning goals, such as being able to understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in critical perspective, it is questionable whether a computer may be able to evaluate pupils’ complex learning experiences in a meaningful way. Still, feedback through continual evaluation of a player’s actions is one of the basic tenets of almost any theory on video games and learning (Gee 2003). Thus, we need further analysis on how or whether the computerised systems of educational computer games should be able to provide this feedback.

GC:P is a game that promises to teach pupils critical thinking. One can ask whether it is possible for pupils to learn critical thinking without having to actively reflect and question their own knowledge and experience (Dewey, 1916). Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the limited dialogue between pupils playing GC:P in pairs are able to realise the well-documented potential of “shared inquiry” through pupils (and teachers’) “exploratory talk” (Wegerif, 2007). Returning to our meta-theoretical framework, we will argue that if an educational game aims to foster critical thinking, then this aim will determine what kind of assertions, modes and representation and learning activities that should be embedded in the game design. In the case of GC:P, it seems unlikely that it is possible to teach and learn critical thinking merely by letting pupils interact with the game environment without actively producing meaningful utterances – i.e. through relevant forms of speaking or writing. On the other hand, we should not rule out the possibility of designing an educational computer game, which is able to combine game activities with pupils’ opportunities for mutual self-expression and evaluation through spoken or written forms of communication. Theoretically, this could improve the ability of an educational computer game design to afford pupils’ critical inquiry and bridge the discrepancy between educational means and ends.

#### We believe the United States federal government should be the actor of change- it is the most accessible actor that each team

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ’04(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law

Words and Phrases ‘64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ’03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Federal Government” means the central government in Washington D.C.

**Encarta ‘2K** (Online Encyclopedia, http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

#### Energy production must increase electricity generation

Direskeneli 10 (Haluk, Journal of Turkish Weekly, " On Thermal Power Plants at our Backyard," <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3331/on-thermal-power-plants-at-our-backyard.html>)

Energy production is essential, it is mandatory to increase electricity generation for everyone. Everybody wants more electricity, but no one wants power plants in his/her backyard, even wind power plants since they create a lot of noise.

#### The impact is decision making-

#### Maximizing Debate’s Decision-making training is more valuable than any other aspect of education from topic or critical literature- it transcends all lives present within this round

Strait and Wallace 7

(Strait, L. Paul, George Mason University and Wallace, Brett, George Washington University, “The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making”, Policy Cures? Health Assistance to Africa, Debaters Research Guide)FS

More to the point, debate certainly helps teach a lot of skills, yet we believe that the way policy debate participation encourages you to think is the most valuable educational benefit, because how someone makes decisions determines how they will employ the rest of their abilities, including the research and communication skills that debate builds. Plenty of debate theory articles have explained either the value of debate, or the way in which alternate actor strategies are detrimental to real-world education, but none so far have attempted to tie these concepts together. We will now explain how decision-making skill development is the foremost value of policy debate and how this benefit is the decision-rule to resolving all theoretical discussions about negative fiat. Why debate? Some do it for scholarships, some do it for social purposes, and many just believe it is fun. These are certainly all relevant considerations when making the decision to join the debate team, but as debate theorists they aren’t the focus of our concern. Our concern is finding a framework for debate that educates the largest quantity of students with the highest quality of skills, while at the same time preserving competitive equity. The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. It is the one thing every single one of us will do every day of our lives besides breathing. Decision-making transcends boundaries between categories of learning like “policy education” and “kritik education,” it makes irrelevant considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers, and it transcends questions of what substantive content a debate round should contain. The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational disadvantage weighed against them. It is the skills we learn, not the content of our arguments, that can best improve all of our lives. While policy comparison skills are going to be learned through debate in one way or another, those skills are useless if they are not grounded in the kind of logic actually used to make decisions. The academic studies and research supporting this position are numerous. Richard Fulkerson (1996) explains that “argumentation…is the chief cognitive activity by which a democracy, a field of study, a corporation, or a committee functions. . . And it is vitally important that high school and college students learn both to argue well and to critique the arguments of others” (p. 16). Stuart Yeh (1998) comes to the conclusion that debate allows even cultural minority students to “identify an issue, consider different views, form and defend a viewpoint, and consider and respond to counterarguments…The ability to write effective arguments influences grades, academic success, and preparation for college and employment” (p. 49).Certainly, these are all reasons why debate and argumentation themselves are valuable, so why is real world decision-making critical to argumentative thinking? Although people might occasionally think about problems from the position of an ideal decisionmaker (c.f. Ulrich, 1981, quoted in Korcok, 2001), in debate we should be concerned with what type of argumentative thinking is the most relevant to real-world intelligence and the decisions that people make every day in their lives, not academic trivialities. It is precisely because it is rooted inreal-world logic that argumentative thinking has value. Deanna Kuhn’s research in “Thinking as Argument” explains this by stating that “no other kind of thinking matters more-or contributes more to the quality and fulfillment of people’s lives, both individually and collectively” (p. 156).

#### Decision-making skills are a pre-requisite to making any form of education beneficial or useful

Strait and Wallace ‘7 (Strait, L. Paul, George Mason University and Wallace, Brett, George Washington University, “The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making”, Policy Cures? Health Assistance to Africa, Debaters Research Guide)

Negative claims that excluding critical alternatives is detrimental to education fail to be persuasive when decision-making logic is taken into account. Critical intellectuals and policymakers both take into account the probability that their actions will be successful. Fiating that individuals alter their method of thinking circumvents these questions of probability and thus not only destroys education about policymaking, but offers a flawed approach to activism (or any other purview of action/ philosophy the negative is advocating). Intellectuals and activists have many important considerations relating to resources, press coverage, political clout and method. These questions all are directly related to who is taking action. Alternative debates thus often become frustrating because they do a poor job of explaining who the subject is. Consider the popular Nietzschean alternative, ‘do nothing.” Who is it that the negative wants to do nothing? Does the USFG de nothing? Is it the debaters? Is it the judge who does nothing? Is it every individual, or just individuals in Africa that have to do with the affirmative harm area? All of these questions directly implicate the desirability of the alternative, and thus the education that we can receive from this mode of debate. Alternatives like “vote negative to reject capitalism,” “detach truth from power.” or ‘embrace an infinite responsibility to the other" fall prey to similar concerns. This inability to pin the negative down to a course of action allows them to be shifty in their second rebuttal, and sculpt their alternative in a way that avoids the affirmative’s offense. Rather than increasing education, critical frameworks are often a ruse that allows the negative to inflate their importance and ignore crucial decision-making considerations. Several other offensive arguments can be leveraged by the affirmative in order to insulate them from negative claims that critical debate is a unique and important type of education that the affirmative excludes. The first is discussed above, that the most important benefit to participation in policy debate is not the content of our arguments, but the skills we learn from debating. As was just explained, since the ability to make decisions is a skill activists and intellectuals must use as well, decision- making is a prerequisite to effective education about any subject. The strength of this argument is enhanced when we realize that debate is a game. Since debaters are forced to switch sides they go into each debate knowing that a non-personal mindset will be necessary at some point because they will inevitably be forced to argue against their own convictions. Members of the activity are all smart enough to realize that a vote for an argument in a debate does not reflect an absolute truth, but merely that a team making that argument did the better debating. When it comes to education about content, the number of times someone will change their personal convictions because of something that happens in a debate round is extremely low, because everyone knows it is a game. On the other hand with cognitive skills like the decision-making process which is taught through argument and debate, repetition is vital .The best way to strengthen decision-making’s cognitive thinking skills is to have students practice them in social settings like debate rounds. Moreover, a lot of the decision-making process happens in strategy sessions and during research periods — debaters hear about a particular affirmative plan and are tasked with developing the best response. If they are conditioned to believe that alternate agent counterplans or utopian philosophical alternatives are legitimate responses, a vital teaching opportunity will have been lost.

#### Next is institutional focus disad-

#### Policy making is the only mechanism to achieve institutional change

**Taylor 9** (Matthew M, assistant professor of political science at the University of São Paulo, "Institutional Development through Policy-Making: A Case Study of the Brazilian Central Bank," World Politics - Volume 61, Number 3, July 2009, Muse) jl

This article considers another, perhaps more ubiquitous, cause of endogenously driven accretive institutional change: the policy-making process.[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f9) The policy-making process contributes to solving an important [End Page 489] theoretical problem by providing a bridge between explanations of institutional genesis and of institutional sustainability over time, which have tended to remain quite distinct.[10](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f10) Policy-making can be a causal force that is at work both in the emergence of institutions targeted to specific policy objectives and in their gradual evolution over time. It also provides a useful corrective to the punctuated equilibrium approach, which tends to overstate the stasis "beneath the surface of apparently stable formal institutional arrangements" as well as understate "continuity through putative breakpoints in history."[11](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f11) My logic follows the arguments of Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2005) on the endogeneity of institutional evolution. By their reasoning, the distribution of political power and the distribution of resources are key determinants of institutional choice: power and resources determine how collective choices are made and thus, what institutions are created. But once institutions are in place, they "affect the choice of economic institutions and influence the future evolution of political institutions," resource distribution, and political power.[12](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f12) Temporality is the only factor that saves this model from tautology. To this logic, I add the policy-making process, which is a key conduit between resources and power on the one hand, and institutions on the other. It is not the only factor influencing the allocation of resources, power, or institutional development, of course. And policy-making does not occur in a vacuum; it is influenced by elite attitudes and beliefs, priorities at the apex of the political system, competition between institutions and between actors, and by the course of deliberations over policy ends. But there are several reasons why the policy-making process may be a potent force, especially under ordinary conditions. First, as Paul Pierson has noted, policies have important effects on the rules of the game, "influencing the allocation of economic and political resources, modifying the costs and benefits associated with alternative political strategies, and consequently altering ensuing political development." [13](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.foley.gonzaga.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.3.taylor.html#f13) Second, even if it is highly contentious, policy-making can subtly shift political power in ways that may be imperceptible even to [End Page 490] participants, permitting institutional change to take place "below the radar" without a significant realignment of political forces or a discernible redistribution of societal resources. Third, policy-making matters to political institutions because it is, in a sense, what these institutions are all about. And while there is a certain self-preserving inertia to institutions, in the short term they tend to focus more on contestation over policy results than on debates about institutional structure itself. Policy change occurs relatively frequently and, like water flowing daily through a riverbed, can gradually mold institutions to its flow (even though the new shape of the riverbed will constrain the course of future policy-making). The policy-making process influences institutions in quotidian ways in part by reshaping internal institutional responsibilities. In the process of policy-making, which includes the tasks of designing, choosing, advocating, implementing, and adjusting specific policies, the commitments of individual members of the institution to specific institutional rules may harden or soften, depending on their perceptions about the effectiveness of policy. Policy-making also shapes the internal institutional playing field by reallocating responsibilities and prestige. Successful economic stabilization, for example, may make central banks more likely to focus attention on monetary policy than they might have been previously, and thus may privilege the custodians of monetary policy over a previously elite foreign-exchange trading desk devoted to the complex accounting for exchange transactions under high-inflation conditions. Such flows of talent and resources to new policy foci may remake the institution from the inside. Finally, policy-making often points outsiders-voters, politicians, or constituencies, for example-to institutional changes that would be needed to facilitate adoption or implementation of their preferred policies.

#### This is our internal link into our impacts- political specification is vital to creating an effective strategy

Silverstein ’02 (Marc, Anarchist Communitarian Network, “Breaking Free of the Protest Mentality”, 4-25,

<http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/Discus/2002-04-25Silverstein.htm>)

But it seems that if a "movement" is going to be built, it needs a rational, comprehensive, holistic analysis of the current situation, and a **fleshed-out, detailed, practical strategy** to achieve whatever it is that happens to be its goals. The means must be consistent with the ends. This analysis and strategy would give direction to a movement and would act as a vehicle for personal and social transformation. What is alarming is the complete lack of any serious analysis or strategy, or even any concern over a lack of analysis or strategy, and the crowd's willingness, even eagerness to shout slogans, hold signs, and regurgitate the rhetoric of the speakers. Estimates for this march were put at 10-15,000 by the mainstream media and 75-100,000 by the independent media (both of whom exaggerate numbers to serve their particular agenda). Regardless, the march was in the tens of thousands. It seems that 50,000 people would be able to gather together and deliberate on a grassroots level, based on free association, through networks of affinity groups and spokes-councils, their strategic and organizational **plan of action**. Instead, those same 50,000 people chose to walk around as an amorphous mass, chanting, holding signs, letting the government know how bad and inhuman it is and how it should stop funding murderous states, and basically putting themselves in a humiliating position of powerlessness. Protestors are in the classic role of "protestors", people with no real power over their lives so they must demand it from the ruling class. Demonstrations also point to a lack of creativity; the only thing we can come up with is playing the song and dance of our rulers. How much longer will these protests go on for? If we could only get a few more tens of thousands to protest, will we be successful in overthrowing capitalism, the state and wage-slavery? Why do the state, capitalism and wage-slavery exist, why do the governments of the U.S. and Israel do what they do, and what are we actually going to do about it? One of the speakers, from a Muslim rights group, appealed to President Bush to warn Ariel Sharon that if he doesn't stop his war crimes, then immediate action will be taken. It is unbearably painful to witness such utter naivety. It is quite apparent that genocide and "war crimes" are normal functions of any state, that they are not doing anything irresponsible. The state will do anything to maintain its power, whether legal or illegal. Leftists and progressives point out that Israel has violated the Geneva Convention, and that their activity is "illegal". By accepting the false dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal" we are accepting their frame of reference and their world-view. We are viewing the situation from a liberal, idealistic perspective, of how the state is supposed to behave. Radicals and revolutionaries over a hundred years ago recognized the essential purpose of the state and capitalism, they weren't fooled by it, and they weren't sucked in by reformism. It seems we are a long way to go to reach the same logical conclusions that were reached in the 1870s! There seems to be a lack of prefigurative politics, or even an understanding of what that means. Prefigurative politics is based on the notion that the "future society" is how we act in the present, what kinds of interactions, processes, structures, institutions, and associations we create right now, and how we live our lives. The notion that we just need more people, more resources, and more money to be channeled into these protests is utterly naïve, because it mistakes the problem as being quantitative, when in fact it is qualitative. The qualitative component deals with how we treat each other, the quality of people's lives, meeting individual wants and preferences, strengthening our ability to clearly and honestly communicate with each other our concerns, needs, feelings, and requests, in the context of a small-scale face-to-face environment. On the other hand, protests are mostly concerned with numbers, masses, and large, bureaucratized organizations, concerns which all too often ignore the crucial individual and inter-personal aspects. The protests against the G-8 conference last July in Genoa, Italy included up to 200,000 demonstrators, yet the only outcomes of the protest were a militarized police state bordering on fascism (or perhaps fascist), one dead, and many imprisoned and seriously injured. The strategy of protest doesn't seem to be getting us anywhere, so it is a wonder why people continue to engage in this failed tactic. If a methodology is proven time and time again of not being successful, then the rational response would be to critically examine the inadequacies of the unsuccessful methodology, and creatively and collectively think up and experiment with new methodologies. The few instances when these mass demonstrations are critiqued, they are rarely ever rejected in toto; instead the solution is to have protests on the level of local communities and neighborhoods, rather than mass convergences to large cities. Their argument is that this would bridge the gap between activists and "regular people" and get more people active and radicalized in their local communities, and to have a more secure base of resistance. But the size of the protests are not the real problem, the real problem is the protest mentality itself, which remains qualitatively the same whether it's in a working-class neighborhood or in a major city. Most of the corporate media reported that the protests were overwhelmingly "peaceful", and many of the protestors were quite content with this. Both sides accept the dichotomy of "peaceful"/"violent", just as they accept the dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal". This traps them into a moralistic, Statist mindset. Even the militant black bloc in past protests has never failed to mention that "property destruction is not violence", which indicates that they still accept this basic duality. The media are our enemy, their interests are antithetical to ours, and to hope for any kind of "positive coverage" is pie in the sky. We should not be surprised if the police beat and arrest us, if the media defame us, and if the general public hate us. That is to be expected, and we should start to recognize this and move on. There doesn't seem to be so much a "movement" as there is a collection of divergent tendencies and ideologies, many of them incompatible with each other. With every protest, there has been very little attention to what we hope to achieve, and the claim that all protests, demonstrations, marches and rallies are useless and counter-productive is a new and shocking concept for most activists. The reason that the vast majority of "ordinary people" view us with fear and contempt is because we have nothing to offer them. The power of capitalism and the State does not exist in the streets, in blocking and shutting down major intersections. It exists in the everyday lives of people, more specifically: in their homes, workplaces, and communities. If we don't work on creating **practical alternatives** to the capitalist system, then it is no wonder most people won't join us - we don't offer them anything, and our petty squabbles are totally irrelevant to their lives. The strategy I propose is of creating spheres of autonomy and self-sufficiency based on free association and common preference finding: bolos, temporary and permanent autonomous zones, counter-institutions, popular assemblies (see: http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=8614 for a contemporary example), small-scale decentralized agriculture, community gardens en masse, guilds, kibbutzes, worker-owned cooperatives, squats, local barter clubs (which have been popping up throughout parts of Argentina, see: http://www.infoshop.org/inews/stories.php? story=02/03/02/5676701, communist stores (based on the principle of "take what you need, donate what you can"), co-housing, urban and rural intentional communities, alternative and sustainable technology, computer-linked networks for co-ordinating and making decisions on a large-scale basis. Computer-linked networks may in fact supercede entirely the need for popular assemblies. The reason that creating these types of anti-authoritarian structures is a much more worthwhile strategy than protest and direct confrontation with the State is because it hits the State and capitalism where it hurts. Food Not Bombs, Independent Media Centers, micro-radio and the like are also important, but they don't provide people with food, clothing, and housing - that is, the real necessities of life. The Black Panthers' Party in the 1960s and 70s set up free breakfast and lunch programs for neighborhood kids, community medical clinics, and self-defense classes. The fact that these counter-institutions triggered so much State repression, sometimes more so than armed struggle, shows how effective and threatening they were to the State. Keith Preston, in "Anarchism or Anarcho-Social Democracy?", writes: "Strategically, we need to follow the example of the most successful anarchist forces of all time- the Spanish anarchist revolutionaries. Our revolutionary agenda should be to develop an alliance of community organizations, unions, cooperatives, enterprises, service organizations, youth clubs, study groups and other popular associations". What I've sketched above are just a few outlines of a strategy, described abstractly, which embodies the kind of direction I think we should be going in. The protest mentality is getting us nowhere, it is a strategy of powerlessness - it is not "what democracy looks like". If we are serious about doing away with this rotten system and living in a new way, we have to know what it is that we don't want, **what it is we do want, and how to go about getting what we want.** What we need is a new, radical, concrete, utopian praxis, free of the failed methodologies of Leftism, activism and protest.

#### Theoretical remedies are insufficient- policy expertise is key to solve

McClean ‘1 (David E. “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Am. Phil. Conf., [www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm](http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm))

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### This educational model is vital to policy and academia– prevents insular education- this answers FIAT isn’t real

Jentleson ‘2 (Bruce W. Jentleson, Source: International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring, 2002), pp. 169-183, “Bringing Policy Relevance Back In”, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092106>, Spring 2002, LEQ)

So, a Washington for- eign policy colleague asked, which of your models and theories should I turn to now? What do you academics have to say about September 11? You are sup- posed to be the scholars and students of international affairs-Why did it hap- pen? What should be done? Notwithstanding the surly tone, the questions are not unfair. They do not pertain just to political scientists and international relations scholars; they can be asked of others as well. It falls to each discipline to address these questions as they most pertain to its role. To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance-too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it.1 The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap."2 The events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conver- sations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'etre. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum."3 Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the aca- demic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self- servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued. September 11 Questions: Answers from the International Relations Literature? What knowledge is most needed to understand September 11 and the ques- tions posed about its causes, consequences, and the policy agenda it has set? And what answers do political scientists and especially international relations specialists have to offer? Four sets of questions need to be considered.

### Technocratic Paradigms

#### Turn- fossil fuels revolutionized modernity into the highest living standards ever – transition away would take humanity with it

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

Until the last quarter of a millennium, mankind depended on living nature for all its food and clothing, most of its energy, and much of its material and medicines. She dictated mankind’s numbers, well-being, and living standards. But she has never been constant. She would smile on some, but not on others. Her smiles, always temporary, would inevitably be replaced by frowns. Her Malthusian checks—hunger, famine, disease, or conflict—ensured that there was little or no progress in the human condition. Many people did not even survive into their 20s, populations grew very slowly, and living standards were generally constrained to subsistence levels. Gradually, with the accumulation of human capital, exchange of ideas, and hard work, mankind started to commandeer more land to meet its needs and develop technologies that, in some cases, amplified Nature’s bounty but, in other cases, bypassed her altogether. These led to higher food production, better health, longer lifespans, and larger populations with better living standards, which then reinforced human capital and the exchange of ideas, which begat yet more and better technologies. Thus was the cycle of progress born and set in motion. The cycle had been moving forward in fits and starts before fossil fuels—ancient nature’s bequest to humanity—became ubiquitous. 121 But fossil fuels assured progress. The cycle accelerated. Mankind’s dependence on nature declined. It became less vulnerable to weather, climate, disease, and other sources of natural disasters. The Malthusian bonds that held mankind and its well-being in check started to stretch, until they were burst asunder. Today, fossil fuels are responsible for at least 60 percent of mankind’s food. They also provide 81 percent of mankind’s energy supply, while nature supplies only 10 percent. Sixty percent of the fiber used globally for clothing and other textiles are synthetic, coming mainly from fossil fuels. Much (thirty percent) of the remaining—so-called natural fiber, relies heavily on fossil fuel– based fertilizers and pesticides. With respect to materials, although global estimates are unavailable, nature provides only 5 percent of U.S. materials (by weight). But even this 5 percent, just like the remaining 95 percent, cannot be processed, transported and used without energy inputs. Without fossil fuels, humanity would be unable to feed itself, and what food there was would be costlier. There would be more hunger. There would be insufficient energy and materials available to sustain the economy at more than a fraction of its current level. Public health would suffer, living standards would plummet, human well-being would be drastically diminished, and the population would crash. In the absence of the technologies that depend directly or indirectly on fossil fuels, humanity would have had to expand cropland by another 150 percent to meet the current demand for food. Even more land would have had to be annexed to satisfy existing requirements for energy, materials, clothing, and other textiles using nature’s products. Not only have these fossil fuel–dependent technologies ensured that humanity’s progress and well-being are no longer hostage to nature’s whims, but they saved nature herself from being devastated by the demands of a rapidly expanding and increasingly voracious human population. Progress today depends on technological change; economic development; trade in goods, services and ideas; and human capital. But technology is the product of ideas, and fossil fuels have been vital for the generation of ideas. Specifically, fossil fuels have helped give us—and not just the rich amongst us—illumination, which expands our time; machines that preserve our level of energy; better health and longer life expectancies; faster and more voluminous trade in goods and ideas; more rapid communications within a wider network; and a much larger population. Reinforcing each other, they increased the stock of human capital and created more opportunities for exchanging ideas, which spawned even more ideas and technologies. And today humanity’s numbers, well-being, and living standards have never been higher. In summary, although fossil fuels did not initiate the cycle of progress and are imperfect, they are critical for maintaining the current level of progress. It may be possible to replace fossil fuels in the future. Nuclear energy is waiting in the wings but, as the high subsidies and mandates for renewables attest, renewables are unable to sustain themselves today. Perhaps, with help from fossil fuels, new ideas will foster technologies that will enable a natural transition away from such fuels.

#### Turn- fossil fuels are the only economic system capable of meeting the demands of globalization

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

The collective demand for land to meet humanity’s demands for food, fuel, and other products of living nature is—and always has been—the single most important threat to ecosystems and biodiversity. 63 Fossil fuel– dependent technologies have kept that demand for land in check. This positive aspect of the impact of fossil fuels on the environment has been ignored in most popular narratives, which instead emphasize fossil fuels’ potential detrimental effects, including air, water, and solid-waste pollution, as well as any climate change associated with the use and production of these fuels. Because of this oversight, and thus lacking balance, these studies generally conclude that fossil fuels have been an environmental disaster. To obtain a notion of the magnitude of the environmental benefits of fossil fuels, consider just the effect of fertilizers and pesticides on the amount of habitat saved from conversion to cropland because fossil fuels were used to meet current food demands. The Haber-Bosch process, by itself, is responsible for feeding 48 percent of global population and pesticides have reduced losses from pests for a range of food-related crops by 26–40 percent. Together, these two sets of technologies might therefore be responsible for feeding approximately 60 percent of the world’s population, assuming that pesticides that are not manufactured with significant fossil fuel inputs would be half as effective as those that require fossil fuels. Therefore, had fossil fuels not been used, the world would have needed to increase the global amount of cropland by an additional 150 percent. 64 This means that to maintain the current level of food production, at least another 2.3 billion hectares of habitat would have had to be converted to cropland. This is equivalent to the total land area of the United States, Canada, and India combined. Considering the threats posed to ecosystems and biodiversity from the existing conversion of 1.5 billion hectares of habitat to cropland, the effect of increasing that to 3.8 billion hectares is inestimable. 65 The above calculation underestimates the additional habitat that would have to be converted to cropland because it assumes that the additional 2 billion hectares of cropland would be as productive as the current 1.5 billion hectares—an unlikely proposition since the most productive areas are probably already under cultivation. Moreover, even if the same level of production could have been maintained, eschewing the use of today’s first-best technologies to produce fertilizers or pesticides would necessarily have meant higher food prices. That would have added to the 925 million people that the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates are already chronically hungry worldwide.

#### The alternative fails- fossil fuels are irreplaceable

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

53 Thus, for both the United States and the world, energy use, for practical purposes, is synonymous with fossil fuels. In the absence of fossil fuels, the world would have had to rely on renewables and/ or nuclear. Renewables, however, are much more land-intensive, and any effort to increase their use would necessarily have involved massive conversion of land to energy generation. 54 The fact that currently the world relies primarily on fossil fuels rather than renewables, despite relatively generous subsidies and stringent mandates that favor the latter, indicates that renewables are not economically viable on larger scales. Based on the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2011 study on subsidies for electrical generation, 55 the Institute for Energy Research calculates that in 2010, fossil fuels received a subsidy equivalent to $0.64 per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity produced, solar and wind received $776 and $56.3 per MWh, respectively, and nuclear received $3.14.

### Alternative Policy Paradigm

#### Decentralization creates larger inequalities- causes elitism

Marcus B. Lane, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Wisconsin-Madison, “Decentralization or privatization of environmental governance? Forest conﬂict and bioregional assessment in Australia,” 2003, *Journal of Rural Studies*, Vol. 19, Issue 3

The trend toward decentralization and enhancing the role of civil society is now discernable in many aspects of natural resource policy around the world, including: forest management, conservation, watershed management, and regional planning (Healey, 1997; Freemuth, 1996; Friedmann, 1998; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Gibson et al., 2000; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Snow, 2001) as well as a host of other areas of social policy (Ehrenberg, 1999; Eberly, 2000). Few voices have been heard to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy. Some (e.g. Leach et al., 1999) have shown how the operation of power relations at the local level can operate to exclude some interests, thereby **undermining the democratic claims of the optimists**. Observers of decentralization in the context of developing countries have suggested that decentralization can **enhance the dominance of elites, deepen authoritarian governance, and even increase intolerance toward minorities** (Ribot, 2002; Diamond, 1999). Some critics in the rush to decentralize governance have emphasized the importance of the state as a mediating force and its potential for fashioning effective policy in democratic ways (Ehrenberg, 1999; Hutchcroft, 2001; Rangan, 1999). The arguments in favor of decentralized planning and an empowered civil society rest on an assumption that Western nations are pluralist democracies, i.e. polities in which differentiated actors compete to deﬁne governmental agenda, and in which government arbitrates among the competing claims made to it (Healey, 1997; Weber, 1998; Bohman, 2000). It is further assumed that the de-centered or fragmented character of these polities creates spaces for deliberative discourse, and democratic expression and interaction. But, as many have noted, the state is hardly monolithic (Rangan, 1999). Diverse elements of the (centralized) state are in constant interaction with other elements of the public sphere, producing **diverse rather than uniform** outcomes. In addition, instead of being an apolitical, neutral referee, state agencies routinely develop and prosecute agenda of their own as Scott (1998) has shown in elaborate detail, rather than necessarily acting as neutral referees of contested politics. The state, like civil society, can be active in both the creation of both progressive and regressive politics. By enhancing the policy role of non-state actors, devolved processes can, rather than democratizing planning and decision-making, produce undemocratic outcomes (Beck, 1992). Power relations among elements of civil society and state actors might create the preconditions for a system of **clientelism**, i.e. patronage relationships between the state and key non-state actors that serve to exclude others, or for corporatism, i.e. private agreements brokered between the state and elite actors (see Fox, 1994; Healey, 1997). Young(1990) argues that these outcomes are possible because interest group pluralism makes no distinction between the assertion of selﬁsh interests and normative claims to justice or democracy. This ‘‘strategic conception of policy discussion foresters political cynicism’’ by ensuring that interests groups act to win policy contests (by any means) rather than promoting the public deliberation of normative ethics (Young, 1990, p. 72). Most importantly, and echoing the concerns of Beck (1992), Healey (1997) and others, interest group decisionmaking overpowers public deliberation in favor of private negotiations between state agencies and private organizations (Young, 1990, p. 73). How do the advocates of deliberative democracy through civic engagement respond to these concerns? Putnam (1993) suggests that the social capital (i.e. bonds of mutual trust and reciprocity) developed through civic engagement can overcome the potential for undemocratic outcomes. Similarly, Forester (1999) promotes a transformative theory of social learning in which both the arguments and participants change through dialogic learning. Habermas, so widely drawn upon by advocates of decentralized, dialogic approaches to governance is, however, more cautious. Democracy, he argues, is a more ﬂeeting, ephemeral quality because ‘‘democratic procedure must be embedded in contexts it cannot itself regulate’’ (Habermas, quoted in Bohman, 2000).

#### Collapses civil society and causes resource wars- turns case

**Batterbury and Fernando ’06** [Simon P.J. Batterbury, University of Melbourne, VIC, Australia, and Jude L. Fernando, Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA, “Rescaling Governance and the Impacts of Political and Environmental Decentralization: An Introduction,” 9/20/2006, *World Development*, Vol. 34, Issue 11]

Most large aid projects are now accompanied by environment assessments of their impacts. The World Bank’s project funding has “greened” since the 1980s. A series of environmental conditionalities now accompany major infrastructure projects, further “disciplining” recipient countries and local populations into accepting new laws, property rights, and environmental commitments (Goldman, 2004). These commitments also give rise to new regimes of governance. Goldman’s analysis of the Bank-supported Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric scheme on the Mekong River in Laos shows how a highly lucrative proposed project has become the vehicle for new environmental laws that will regulate the biological resources in the vicinity while also permitting the dam to generate dollars for Laos and electricity for its neighbors. New national environmental legislation builds on a decade of donor-funded forestry and biodiversity plans and legal frameworks that literally finance and run several government ministries, and all with extensive foreign input. Some 84% of state investment was in the energy, forestry, construction and transport sectors by the mid-1990s, far outweighing spending on health, education, and public services (Goldman, 2004, p. 179). New environmental zoning classifications, and a forestry law, carve up territory occupied by farmers and swidden cultivators, in accordance with scientific principles of “good” forest use, and these are legitimized by numerous environmental and social assessments. Such “green conditionalities” are key to understanding certain new governance arrangements that are so large in scale, and all-encompassing, to be considered as examples of “eco-governmentality.” Similarly as Ribot et al. (this issue; Larson & Ribot, 2004) explain, the global decentralization of forest management has often failed to create downwardly accountable local institutions, and many decentralization schemes exhibit nepotism, central government interference, or capture by elites (see also McCarthy, 2004). Ribot et al. conclude that political-economic calculations compromise both the efficiency and the potential conservation gains of these decentralization efforts, tying political networks more and more into natural resources policy. These, and other studies reinforce the claims of political ecologists that there are no simplistic linkages between resource use, economic activity, the breakdown of civil order or security, and development outcomes (Peluso & Watts, 2001). “**Struggles over resources lie at the center of struggles over power**” (Peet & Watts, 2004, p. xiv), and there is a clear link between **local politics and social relations**, and the “larger processes of material transformation and power relations” in the environmental domain (Peluso & Watts, 2001, p. 5). Resource degradation results from, and strongly influences, political and social change. It is vital to seek explanations for these changes at multiple scales, and across the human and non-human worlds; from the international economy down to the systems of rules governing local access to forests.5 Biophysical change, social relations and politics, and ideas and discourses (made real by policy) are linked. The processes acting upon places are scaled and nested within each other. This type of research, some of it conducted under the banner of political ecology, permits assessments of the multiple impacts of governance changes, and particularly those created by the decentralization of resource management. On human rights grounds, the relinquishing of state control over aspects of natural resource management “downwards” to local people has been perceived as positive (IIED, 2004). But there are still major questions about the efficacy of decentralizing to levels where new political schisms and the capture of rents by elites can occur—decentralized institutions need to be well understood and well designed to prevent this ( [19] and [Mansuri and Rao, 2004]). Furthermore, the ecological, political, and discursive elements of the policy need to be analyzed simultaneously, especially where local institutions gain new powers over natural resources. Reconciling culturally appropriate practices with universal standards of environmental governance is a major challenge, rarely carried out successfully, and often involving episodes of mutual incomprehension and distrust, as Filer shows in his descriptions of the many failed environmental crusades in Papua New Guinea’s forests (Filer, 2000). Decentralized decision-making structures need to be adaptive and flexible in order to deal with high levels of uncertainty, as well as to respond to a continuing flow of new evidence and scientific information.

#### The plan doesn’t solve democracy- the process will be controlled by intellectual elites

**Hoffman and Pippert ‘05** [Steven M. Hoffman, PhD, Professor of Political Science at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Angela High-Pippert, PhD, Director of Women's Studies at the University of St. Thomas, and serves on the ACTC Women's Studies Coordinating Committee, “Community Energy: A Social Architecture for an Alternative Energy Future”, Bulletin of Science Technology & Society 2005 25: 387, http://www.stthomas.edu/politicalscience/communityenergy/comenergyarchitect11.html]

Community-based energy, using clean and renewable forms of energy, offers a serious alternative to the on-going despoliation of the planet caused by the current energy system. Yet, the nature of community energy and the role that such initiatives might play in the general fabric of civic life is not well understood. This paper makes it clear that several conceptual models are available. Community energy initiatives might, for instance, perform the intermediate role envisioned by so-called “stealth theorists”, allowing the mass of citizens to avoid the sort of engagement preferred by a select group of citizens actively and continuously involved in intense, democratic debate (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). For those participating in an initiative the time and effort would be more significant and on-going than participation in other forms of engagement such as a deliberative polling process or a citizen’s jury. But in all instances, intense engagement would be confined to a fairly narrow set of citizens, namely those citizens with the requisite education and knowledge. Interaction with the larger community would be limited to message development, i.e., “wind is good/nuclear is bad”, and the mass of citizens would have only limited personal involvement, say, a willingness to participate in a community-sponsored energy conservation program. Only very rarely would the majority of citizens be expected to aggressively participate in public policy making or in any sort of sustained political process. Thus, community-based initiatives could legitimately be limited to “communities of interest” based upon any number of criteria, including individual financial gain.

#### The plan leads to third-party ownership- makes centralization inevitable

**Farell ‘10** [John, an ILSR senior researcher specializing in energy policy developments that best expand the benefits of local ownership and dispersed generation of renewable energy, “Community Solar Power,” online]

In most cases, investors in community solar projects are not treated as owners, but rather as power¶ purchasers via a subscription, lease or license. In general, the upfront investment of a subscriber buys¶ them a right to the electricity for a fixed time (e.g. 20 years) but the project developer (usually a utility)¶ maintains ownership rights. The limited access to the electricity generation had significant implications¶ for project economics. The term limits for SolPartners, SunSmart, and Solar Pioneers are shorter than the¶ payback period, leaving community solar investors in those towns in the red. The exceptions to the¶ limited terms were the three ownership-based projects: University Park, Clean Energy Collective, and¶ Greenhouse Solar, which all used an LLC model.¶ Overall, the ownership issue is complex. Individual or collective ownership has risks, from equipment¶ failure (inverters are almost guaranteed to need replacement within 20 years) to ongoing maintenance¶ (minimal). From the standpoint of risk, many people may prefer not to be responsible for their solar¶ array. This is reflected in the popularity of residential third-party solar ownership programs such as¶ SunRun, SolarCity, and others. Community solar may be similar, where participants prefer to have¶ limited responsibility, although the Clean Energy Collective is pioneering the use of a maintenance¶ escrow to minimize these concerns.¶ The danger of third-party ownership structures (whether for individual or community solar) is that they¶ risk commoditizing solar electricity and making it feel no different than buying traditional electricity from¶ the utility. Ownership provides a tangible sense of investment in energy production, shifting the owner’s¶ mindset from energy consumption to the balance between consumption and production. It also builds a¶ constituency for distributed renewable energy in a way that buying solar-derived electricity as a¶ commodity may not.

**Alt can’t change consumptive practices**

**Jackson**, 20**12** (Tim, Fairly bright guy, *Prosperity Without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet*, Kindle Locations 2803-2854)

The downshifting movement now has a surprising allegiance across a number of developed economies. A recent survey on downshifting in Australia found that 23 per cent of respondents had engaged in some form of downshifting in the five years prior to the study. A staggering 83 per cent felt that Australians are too materialistic. An earlier study in the US found that 28 per cent had taken some steps to simplify and 62 per cent expressed a willingness to do so. Very similar results have been found in Europe.23 Research on the success of these initiatives is quite limited. But the findings from studies that do exist are interesting. In the first place, the evidence confirms that ‘simplifiers’ appear to be happier. Consuming less, voluntarily, can improve subjective well-being – completely contrary to the conventional model.24 At the same time, intentional communities remain marginal. The spiritual basis for them doesn’t appeal to everyone, and the secular versions seem less resistant to the incursions of consumerism. Some of these initiatives depend heavily on having sufficient personal assets to provide the economic security needed to pursue a simpler lifestyle. More importantly, even those in the vanguard of social change turn out to be haunted by conflict – internal and external.25 These conflicts arise because people find themselves at odds with their own social world. Participation in the life of society becomes a challenge in its own right. People are trying to live, quite literally, in opposition to the structures and values that dominate society. In the normal course of events, these structures and values shape and constrain how people behave. They have a profound influence on how easy or hard it is to behave sustainably.26 The Role of Structural Change Examples of the perverse effect of dominant structures are legion: private transport is incentivized over public transport; motorists are prioritized over pedestrians; energy supply is subsidized and protected, while demand management is often chaotic and expensive; waste disposal is cheap, economically and behaviourally; recycling demands time and effort: ‘bring centres’ are few and far between and often overflowing with waste. Equally important are the subtle but damaging signals sent by government, regulatory frameworks, financial institutions, the media and our education systems: business salaries are higher than those in the public sector, particularly at the top; nurses and those in the caring professions are consistently less well paid; private investment is written down at high discount rates making longterm costs invisible; success is counted in terms of material status (salary, house size and so on); children are brought up as a ‘shopping generation’ – hooked on brand, celebrity and status.27 Policy and media messages about the recession underline this point. Opening a huge new shopping centre at the height of the financial crisis in October 2008, Mayor of London Boris Johnson spoke of persuading people to come out and spend their money, despite the credit crunch. Londoners had made a ‘prudent decision to give Thursday morning a miss and come shopping’, he said of the huge crowds who attended the opening.28 George W. Bush’s infamous call for people to ‘go out shopping’ in the wake of the 9/11 disaster is one of the most staggering examples of the same phenomenon. Little wonder that people trying to live more sustainably find themselves in conflict with the social world around them. These kinds of asymmetry represent a culture of consumption that sends all the wrong signals, penalizing pro-environmental behaviour, and making it all but impossible even for highly motivated people to act sustainably without personal sacrifice. It’s important to take this evidence seriously. As laboratories for social change, intentional households and communities are vital in pointing to the possibilities for flourishing within ecological limits. But they are also critical in highlighting the limits of voluntarism. Simplistic exhortations for people to resist consumerism are destined to failure. Particularly when the messages flowing from government are so painfully inconsistent. People readily identify this inconsistency and perceive it as hypocrisy. Or something worse. Under current conditions, it’s tantamount to asking people to give up key capabilities and freedoms as social beings. Far from being irrational to resist these demands, it would be irrational not to, in our society. Several lessons flow from this. The first is the obvious need for government to get its message straight. **Urging people to Act on CO2**, to insulate their homes, turn down their thermostat, put on a jumper, drive a little less, walk a little more, holiday at home, buy locally produced goods (and so on) **will either go unheard or be rejected as manipulation for as long as all the messages about high-street consumption point in the opposite direction**.29 Equally, **it’s clear that changing the social logic of consumption cannot simply be relegated to the realm of individual choice. In spite of a growing desire for change, it’s almost impossible for people to simply choose sustainable lifestyles, however much they’d like to. Even highly-motivated individuals experience conflict as they attempt to escape consumerism. And the chances of extending this behaviour across society are negligible without changes in the social structure**.

**their method prioritizes observations without pragmatic strategy ---- continues to re-entrench the squo**

Bryant 12 (Levi, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/)

I must be in a mood today– half irritated, half amused –because I find myself ranting. Of course, that’s not entirely unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental movement that pushed all the right button. As the post read,¶ For mainstream environmentalism– conservationism, green consumerism, and resource management –humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of ‘raw materials’ and ‘resources’ through which human-centered wants, constructed as needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!]. Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, “Green Syndicalism”¶ While finding elements this description perplexing– I can’t say that I see many environmentalists treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that we’re sovereigns of nature –I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage.¶ What I wonder is just what we’re supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation, resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in activities that are making real differences. From this passage– and maybe the entire text would disabuse me of this conclusion –it sounds like we are to reject all of these interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.¶ The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: ¶ Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶ Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

#### There’s always value to life

Frankl ’46 (Holocaust Survivor) 46 (Victor Frankl, Professor of Neurology and Psychiatry at the University of Vienna, Man’s Search for Meaning, 1946, p. 104)

But I did not only talk of the future and the veil which was drawn over it. I also mentioned the past; all its joys, and how its light shone even in the present darkness. Again I quoted a poet—to avoid sounding like a preacher myself—who had written, “Was Dii erlebst, k,ann keme Macht der Welt Dir rauben.” (What you have experienced, no power on earth can take from you.) Not only our experiences, but all we have done, whatever great thoughts we may have had, and all we have suffered, all this is not lost, though it is past; we have brought it into being. Having been is also a kind of being, and perhaps the surest kind. Then I spoke of the many opportunities of giving life a meaning. I told my comrades (who lay motionless, although occasionally a sigh could be heard) that human life, under any circumstances, never ceases to have a meaning, and that this infinite meaning of life includes suffering and dying, privation and death. I asked the poor creatures who listened to me attentively in the darkness of the hut to face up to the seriousness of our position. They must not lose hope but should keep their courage in the certainty that the hopelessness of our struggle did not detract from its dignity and its meaning. I said that someone looks down on each of us in difficult hours—a friend, a wife, somebody alive or dead, or a God—and he would not expect us to disappoint him. He would hope to find us suffering proudly—not miserably—knowing how to die.

#### Democratic checks prevent their impact from escalating

O’Kane ‘97 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

#### No root cause

Goldstein 2 Joshua S., Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland War and Gender , P. 412 2k2

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice”. Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.  So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression/” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

#### The ends justify the means

Isaac 2 (Jeffrey, Professor of PoliSci @ Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD Yale, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent Magazine Vol 49 Issue 2)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law [it] can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Structural violence makes the perfect the enemy of the good—Preventing war is a good thing

Coady ‘7 (C.A.J, Australian philosopher with an international reputation for his research in both epistemology and political and applied philosophy, Morality and Political Violence, pg. 28, 2007, Cambridge University Press)

First, let us look briefly at the formulation of his definition, which has some rather curious features. It seems to follow from it that a young child is engaged in violence if its expression of its needs and desires is such that it makes its mother and/or father very tired, even if it is not in any ordinary sense “a violent child” or engaged in violent actions. Furthermore, I will be engaged in violence if, at your request, I give you a sleeping pill that will reduce your actual somatic and mental realisations well below their potential, at least for some hours. Certainly some emendation is called for, and it may be possible to produce a version of the definition that will meet these difficulties (the changing of “influenced” to “influenced against their will” might do the job, but at the cost of making it impossible to act violently toward someone at their request, and that doesn’t seem to be impossible, just unusual). I shall not dwell on this, however, because I want rather to assess Galtung’s reason for seeking to extend the concept of violence in the way he does. His statement of the justification of his definition is as follows: “However, it will soon be clear why we are rejecting the narrow concept of violence according to which violence is somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health, alone (with killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the consequence. If this were all violence is about, and peace is seen as its negation, then too little is rejected when peace is held up as an ideal. Highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace. Hence an extended concept of violence is indispensable but the concept should be a logical extension, not merely a list of undesirables.”16 So, for Galtung, the significance of his definition of violence lies in the fact that if violence is undesirable and peace desirable, then if we draw a very wide bow in defining violence we will find that the ideal of peace will commit us to quite a lot. Now it seems to me that this justification of the value of his definition is either muddled or mischievous (and just possibly both). If the suggestion is that peace cannot be a worthy social ideal or goal of action unless it is the total ideal, then the suggestion is surely absurd. A multiplicity of compatible but non-inclusive ideals seems as worthy of human pursuit as a single comprehensive goal, and, furthermore, it seems a more honest way to characterize social realities. Galtung finds it somehow shocking that highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible with peace, but only the total ideal assumption makes this even surprising. It is surely just an example of the twin facts that since social realities are complex, social ideals and ills do not form an undifferentiated whole (at least not in the perceptions of most men and women), and that social causation is such that some ideals are achievable in relative independence from others. Prosperity, freedom, peace, and equality, for instance, are different ideals requiring different characterisations and justifications, and although it could be hoped that they are compatible in the sense that there is no absurdity in supposing that a society could exhibit a high degree of realization of all four, concrete circumstances may well demand a trade-off amongst them–the toleration, for example, of a lesser degree of freedom in order to achieve peace, or of less general prosperity in the interests of greater equality.

#### Subjective violence is worse—creates psychological violence that is irreparable and distinct from structural violence

Linden ’12 (Harry van der, Butler University, “On the Violence of Systemic Violence: A Critique of Slavoj Zizek”, 1-1-2012, <http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=facsch_papers&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dstructural%2520violence%2520coady%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D6%26ved%3D0CEUQFjAF%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Fdigitalcommons.butler.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1249%2526context%253Dfacsch_papers%26ei%3D445nUNPLGon49QTQpoHIBA%26usg%3DAFQjCNHAtwi4GF88kWuuxN3ymbIA8Y3Ggw#search=%22structural%20violence%20coady%22>)

The “force” at the endpoint of the process of subjective violence, however, stays in place whether the violence is technologically mediated or not, and this force leads to a much more narrow range of harms inflicted by subjective violence than is caused by systemic violence. The harms of subjective violence are death, bodily harms, and acute psychological malfunctioning caused by “force,” while social injustice or systemic violence leads to such a wide variety of harms as social and political exclusion, inadequate intellectual development due to insufficient educational opportunities, harsh working conditions, subsistent wages, lack of free time and recreational opportunities, inadequate housing or no housing at all, lack of basic medical care, hunger, and inadequate access to clean water. We have noted that the degree of permitted counter-violence should vary with the seriousness of the violent threat and the culpability of the perpetrator, and that from this perspective much counter-violence in our society is disproportionate or excessive. Some of the harms of systemic violence (e.g., restricted educational opportunities) are such that revolutionary violence as counter-violence would be disproportionate, especially since revolutionary violence may easily escalate and inevitably include seriously harming people with limited moral responsibility. Other harms caused by poor institutions, though, such as serious illness, starvation, or a much-reduced lifespan, are such that they meet the bar set by proportionality. What should be taken into account in making such proportionality judgments is that subjective violence tends to have a different psychological impact on its victims than systemic violence, even when their respective harms are otherwise equally bad or even similar in kind. Only subjective violence tends to come suddenly to its victims, often leaving them in fear, shock, paralysis, and helplessness. What adds to their trauma is the very realization that another human being is intent on physically harming or killing them, disrupting the everyday trust in minimal human decency and cooperation. So, for example, even a preventable industrial accident that occurs due to infrequent safety inspections as an instance of systemic violence will have a different psychological impact on a mining community than a brutal attack by the mine owner’s private army against a peaceful protest of his workers in support of greater mine safety. Much systemic violence can be integrated into everyday life, but the same is much more difficult to do with regard to most subjective violence. It is this very fact that makes oppressive political violence so often effective in the short run. But, again, the differences here between subjective and systemic violence are less pronounced when subjective violence becomes impersonally or “bureaucratically” executed, as, for example, in penal violence (what happens during an execution provides a good illustration) and strategic bombing (assuming that the bombing campaigns remain limited in scope and frequency). This brings me to the most crucial distinction – for my purpose here – between systemic and subjective violence: the range of options available to the victims in addressing the former are much greater than for the latter. Once the clubs come down or the bullets fly in political protest, the choice is to flee and capitulate, fight back, or hope that nonviolent sacrifice will cease the violence. Similarly, once a war of aggression is under way the basic choice is to fight back or surrender and then hope that a massacre will not follow. Surrender does not preclude nonviolent resistance to the aggressor, but it means at least that the aggressor has been initially successful in imposing his political will. In cases of political violence, the intention of the perpetrator is typically to impose his political will, restricting the options of the victims by making resistance to this will very costly. Personal violence might not have such coercive intent, but similar limited action options are in place. Basically, once an individual attacks you personally, the choice is to fight back or hope that the cheek is not hit too hard when it is turned. In my view, fighting back, or counter-violence, is a prima facie right, but to make its actual execution morally right presumes that other moral standards are satisfied, such as proportionality in the case of individual counter-violence and jus ad bellum and jus in bello standards (or approximations thereof) in the case of collective violence. The mere fact of systemic violence, to the contrary, does not warrant counter-violence; for social injustice can be effectively addressed in many different ways, including through institutional reforms from within, nonviolent protests, boycotts, collective strikes, lobbying, and electoral action. Even when social injustice can only be addressed through revolutionary change, counter-violence is not prima-facie warranted because it might be disproportionate. More importantly, it might not be necessary because it has become abundantly clear during the past few decades that nonviolence strategies can be remarkably successful in overthrowing oppressive regimes and the recent emergence of the global public sphere will only increase the chance of success of future endeavors. However, once the struggle for social justice is met by widespread violence inflicted, or supported, by the state, revolutionary counter-violence is prima facie morally right. Broadly speaking, the ethics of self-defense retains its moral force in light of the fact that nonviolence has not proven to be effective against agents who have no qualms unleashing subjective violence. No doubt, these are all difficult moral issues that should be carefully discussed and placed within their historical context. But all too often this does not happen in Žižek’s work, especially in Violence, and what we find instead is the claim that systemic violence rightfully begets subjective violence because it projects violence. This claim has only a ring of plausibility when we neglect that the two types of violence in this equation create very different ranges of options for remedial action. A more critical use of the concept of violence would not enable him to offer such a broad and facile justification of revolutionary violence. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not claiming that the notion of systemic violence necessarily leads to a broad and superficial justification of revolutionary violence. Galtung, for example, does not make such an inference. However, one must then ask why the inference is not appropriate since it is commonly accepted that counter-violence against wrongful violence is justified. This means that one must show how systemic violence differs from subjective violence so that counter-violence is generally only prima facie just with regard to the latter. I 18 suspect that once such differences are articulated (as I have tried to do in this paper) the notion of systemic violence loses much of its credibility. At any rate, the proponent of the notion of systemic violence should at least caution or clarify that our typical emotive and moral responses to subjective violence might not apply to systemic violence. The proponent also should outline some convincing limits on extending the core concept of violence because without such limits, as will become clear in the next section, we might end up with more conceptual and practical confusion and questionable support of revolutionary violence.

# 2NC

### 2NC Method Overview

#### Debate is a method for arriving a decision. The judge decides between 2 methods for who wins this round:

#### Method 1 is the negative’s – vote for a common starting point to maximize the potential benefit of the three hours we have within this round as explained by our 1NC standards

#### Method 2 is the affirmative’s – use debate to symbolically change the academy by coming to the decision that X is bad

#### Only our method accesses the pivotal internal link into decision-making skills and that is the biggest impact in the round-

#### A. Our method teaches better advocacy --- SSD model to hash it out

#### B. We have the best method of inquiry – rigorously test the other team to find out whether X is good or bad

#### Debate needs to maximize these skills and is the key method for arriving at a decision – in order for that method to be actualized, 3 things must occur:

#### 1 – agreement over the question at hand

#### 2 – opposing sides

#### 3 – equal opportunity to speak- that’s Harr

#### Thus our violation: [Y team] has changed the method of debate from two teams defending opposite sides of a resolution to the winner being whoever best advocates for a ‘change’

#### Absent decision-making skills which debate is key to foster- the knowledge over X and the agency we gain over it is *impotent* and would not be able to be used effectively- decision making skills are a pre-requisite for any change or advocacy to have efficacy and impact

### 2NC Interpretation Overview

#### Our interpretation of debate is grounded through definitional support- providing the best definition is vital to conceptualizing a topic. The best definition of the resolution is necessary for an effective deliberation which is impacted above-

#### Resolved prior to a colon indicates a legislative action and enact a resolution

#### The phrase “the United States federal government should” implies governmental action

#### That federal government is in Washington D.C. and not in this room

#### Only our definitions are contextual to the resolution- context is key with definitions –non contextual definitions miss the boat and are contrived- that’s key to a stable point of accessible understanding of the resolution which is a pre-requisite to an effective debate-

#### The impact is topicality- they do not increase electricity production through legislation- topicality is insular from the framework proper debate- a topical version of the aff could do {X/ Y/ Z} and solves their offense. Topical version solves our ground and fairness internals impacted by decision making

#### THEY say:

### AT: We Meet

#### THEY say:

#### We meet we stand in opposition to current restrictions....

#### THERE is a GIANT difference between criticizing law and overturning it - the elimination of an agent is HUGE in order to generate effective debate

#### A) Limits - they justify criticizing restrictions from ANY PERSPECTIVE - they justify running defending ANY perspective which criticizes legal approaches - deep, social and ecofeminist ecologies - critical race, eco justice - or any form of high philosophy - this picking of any theory without the requirement that they tie it to the government decreases the quality of arguments in the debate since we cannot be expected to prepare for every variation of criticism of the restrictions - topicality is about what they justify

#### B) Ground - we do not have literature about all of the ways that individuals can resist control over energy - Government disads, counterplans and specific criticisms are necessary for negative ground - they provide us with the generics necessary to engage - AND they claim to solve this - they also dodge the debate about increasing energy production

#### The Topical version of the affirmative would have been to have the federal government remove restrictions on locally controlled solar - claim this results in a larger spill up - they then could have criticized the disad and claimed their affirmative mobilized public action

#### EVEN if they win debates about the USFG are good the affirmative is Massively EXTRA-TOPICAL!

#### A) the advocacy statement says:We affirm the resolution through our criticism of the qualitative restrictions which constrain the transition to democratic control and ownership over energy production - this allows them to claim advantages off of energy not from SOLAR or WIND and allows them to access the entirety of the RENEWABLES market – also is a double turn with the second part of the resolution which is about fossil fuels- also proves you can vote negative on presumption- they have no evidence that says restrictions- they only affirm the resolution which means they take no actions because there are no restrictions to be moved- they have the burden of proof to provide a piece of evidence with the word restriction

#### B) this is an independent voting issue - they claim solvency off of their burne and toley evidence which clearly advocates all renewables - they also prove that the resolution alone is insufficient which independently warrants voting negative

### Off 1

#### Violation- the affirmative must specify the legally codified restrictions that they eliminate- all of the “restrictions” that the aff assumes are ideological or attitudinal

#### Restrictions must be a legal limitation

Burton’s Legal Thesaurus ‘7

(Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright © 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.)

restriction n. any limitation on activity, by statute, regulation or contract provision.

#### It’s a voter-

#### Ground- we can’t negate a law that we don’t know about- legal restrictions are key to negative strategy like disads and CPs

#### Education- they destroy our ability to get real topic knowledge at the last tournament of the year- don’t reward their vagueness

#### Key to determine solvency- obviously have to identify the laws they repeal before we can determine if the plan solves

#### Hold the line on T- it’s the damn NDT

### AT Meaning

No policy failure.

Harvey ’97 (Frank, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. – Dalhousie U., “The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War”, p. 138-139)

Linguistic Relativism. One approach of postmodernists is to point to the complex nature of language and meaning as a critique of positiv¬ism; this critique is, in turn, relevant to the overwhelming amount of work in IR (Phillips 1977; Giddens 1979; George and Campbell 1990). Although a comprehensive assessment of the linguistic relativism debate is beyond the scope of this project, it is possible to address the underlying philosophical argument, which is fairly straightforward. Building on the work of Wittgenstein (1968), the linguistic variant of the criticism contends that any attempt to reduce everyday terms "to a singular essentialist meaning" is problematic given "the multiplicity of meaning to be found in social activity" (George and Campbell 1990, 273). By implication, a concept, term, word, or symbol cannot correspond "to some ... externally derived foundation or object" and ulti¬mately is context-dependent. Similarly, Phillips argues that the validity of theory cannot be determined because "There is no standard or objective reality (always fixed, never changing) against which to com¬pare a universe of discourse ... nothing exists outside of our language and actions which can be used to justify ... a statement's truth or falsity" (1977, 273). Of course, it is not entirely clear how this "multiplicity of meaning" is sufficient to render meaningless an approach that assumes the existence of an objective reality. An important distinction must be drawn between the assertion that these discrepancies might have a significant impact on scientific theorizing and the assertion that they do have such an effect. In most cases, errors of interpretation and generalization produced by linguistic nuances are relatively insignificant and ultimately have very little impact on the generalizability of social theories. There are numerous words, symbols, concepts, and ideas, for example, that are commonly understood, regardless of other linguistic variations, but the implications of this standardized conceptual framework are frequently overlooked and ignored in the post¬modern critique. In any case, it is contingent upon the theorist to specify the precise meaning of any variable or symbol that is central to a theory. Although definitions may vary — possibly partly, but not entirely, as a conse¬quence of language — scholars nevertheless are more likely than not to understand and agree on the underlying meaning of most words, symbols and phrases. The point is that theorists generally do have a common starting point and often suspend, at least temporarily, counterproductive debates over meaning in order to shift emphasis towards the strength and logical consistency of the theory itself, a more important issue that has nothing to do with language. Evaluating the internal consistency of the central assumptions and propositions of a theory, that is, criticising from within, is likely to be more conducive to theoretical progress than the alternative, which is to reject the idea of theory building entirely. Finally, the lack of purity and precision, another consequence of linguistic relativism, does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. The study of international relations may not be exact, given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others, but precision is a practical research problem, not an insurmountable barrier to progress. In fact, most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. Clearly, our understanding of the causes of international conflict — and most notably war — has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations (Vasquez 1987, 1993). The alternative approach, implicit in much of the postmodern literature, is to fully accept the inadequacy of positivism, throw one's hands up in failure, given the complexity of the subject, and repudiate the entire enterprise. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy.

### 2NC Decision Making Overview

#### The net benefit to our interpretation is maximizing decision making skills-

#### Decision making skills turn case- they are necessary to ensure their advocacy can translate into activism

#### It’s a pre-requisite to any offense- they can win every argument but absent the skills to use them its pointlesss

#### A prior established resolution as a point of controversy is a prerequisite to effective deliberation- nebulous and vague conceptions result in poor skills

Steinberg ‘8 (Lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45, 2008)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### A point of stasis is key-

Shively 2k (Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000 Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 182-3)

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest**.** It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implica­tions, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. **For** agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to success­fully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agree­ments. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

#### Every active decision that we make in our life calls for effective and ethical decision making skills- it is the terminal impact of all debate

Steinberg ‘8 (Lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45, 2008)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition. Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### 2NC Institutional Focus Overview

#### The institutional focus disad is the disad/ counterplan net benefit to our topicality interpretation- they are inseperable

#### Link- the affirmatives refusal to consign to a static notion of politics prevents effective political formation- our Shively and Silverstein say unconditional stances are key to rigorous testing which is key to policy germaneness and check against amorphion politics- the Tea Party proves citizens have SUFFICIENT CAPACITY to critique and change the State ACTING WITHIN IT through voting and media and that we need skills to COMBAT THAT TAKEOVER- they cause policy expertise ignorance- that’s McClean- causes us to get slapped down- empirically their “guerilla warfare” style of politics FAILS to take-down larger political structures- Jentlenson says we need to increase policy relevance through roleplaying as policy makers- acting as intellectuals causes insular focus and re-entrenches the “us/the” dichotomy

#### Impact is failure of political action- inexpertise causes ignorance or apathy- causes failure- that’s Jentleson- all the impacts of the squo are only solvable through voting negative

Environmental destruction

Wapner ‘8 (Paul Wapner, director of the Global Environmental Politics Program in SIS. Feb 8 (“the importance of critical environmental studies in the new environmentalism” project muse)

To many readers, such questions probably sound familiar. Efforts to rid the world of war, poverty, human rights abuses and injustice in general are perennial challenges that require heightened compassion and a commitment that transcends one’s time on earth. The questions are especially relevant, however, to environmentalists. They represent the kind of challenges we constantly pose to ourselves and to those we try to convince to join us. Environmental issues are some of the gravest dangers facing humanity and all life on the planet. At their most immediate, environmental problems undermine the quality of life for the poorest and are increasingly eroding the quality of life of even the affluent. At the extreme, environmental challenges threaten to fracture the fundamental organic infrastructure that supports life on Earth and thus imperil life’s very survival. What to do? Environmental Studies is the academic discipline charged with trying to figure this out. Like Feminist and Race Studies, it emerged out of a political movement and thus never understood itself as value-neutral. Coming on the heels of the modern environmental movement of the 1960s, environmental studies has directed itself toward understanding the biophysical limits of the earth and how humans can live sustainably given those limits. As such, it has always seen its normative commitments not as biases that muddy its inquiry but as disciplining directives that focus scholarship in scientifically and politically relevant directions. To be sure, the discipline’s natural scientists see themselves as objective observers of the natural world and understand their work as normative only to the degree that it is shaped by the hope of helping to solve environmental problems. Most otherwise remain detached from the political conditions in which their work is assessed. The discipline’s social scientists also maintain a stance of objectivity to the degree that they respect the facts of the social world, but many of them engage the political world by offering policy prescriptions and new political visions. What is it like to research and teach Environmental Studies these days? Where does the normative dimension of the discipline fall into contemporary political affairs? Specifically, how should social thinkers within Environmental Studies understand the application of their normative commitments? Robert Cox once distinguished what he calls “problem-solving” theory from “critical theory.” The former, which aims toward social and political reform, accepts prevailing power relationships and institutions and implicitly uses these as a framework for inquiry and action. As a theoretical enterprise, problem-solving theory works within current paradigms to address particular intellectual and practical challenges. Critical theory, in contrast, questions existing power dynamics and seeks not only to reform but to transform social and political conditions.1 Critical environmental theory has come under attack in recent years. As the discipline has matured and further cross-pollinated with other fields, some of us have become enamored with continental philosophy, cultural and communication studies, high-level anthropological and sociological theory and a host of other insightful disciplines that tend to step back from contemporary events and paradigms of thought and reveal structures of power that reproduce social and political life. While such engagement has refined our ability to identify and make visible impediments to creating a greener world, it has also isolated critical Environmental Studies from the broader discipline and, seemingly, the actual world it is trying to transform. Indeed, critical environmental theory has become almost a sub-discipline to itself. It has developed a rarefied language and, increasingly, an insular audience. To many, this has rendered critical theory not more but less politically engaged as it scales the heights of thought only to be further distanced from practice. It increasingly seems, to many, to be an impotent discourse preaching radical ideas to an already initiated choir. Critical Environmental Studies is also sounding ºat these days coming off the heels of, arguably, the most anti-environmentalist decade ever. The Bush Administration’s tenure has been an all-time low for environmental protection. The Administration has installed industry-friendly administrators throughout the executive branch, rolled back decades of domestic environmental law and international environmental leadership, politicized scientific evidence and expressed outright hostility to almost any form of environmental regulation.2 1. Cox 1996. 2. Gore 2007; and Pope and Rauber 2006. With the US as the global hegemon, it is hard to overestimate the impact these actions have had on world environmental affairs. Being a politically engaged environmental scholar has been difficult during the past several years. In the US, instead of being proactive, the environmental community has adopted a type of rearguard politics in which it has tried simply to hold the line against assaults on everything from the Endangered Species Act, New Source Review and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to the Kyoto Protocol and international cooperative efforts to curb deforestation and loss of biological diversity. Outside the US, the environmental community has had to struggle for pronounced relevance in similar issues as it has operated in the shadow of an environmentally-irresponsible hegemon. Much of the academic world has followed suit, as it were. In the US, it has found itself needing to argue for basics like the knowledge of environmental science, the wisdom of enforcing established law, the importance of holding violators accountable and the significance of the US to remain engaged in international environmental affairs. Outside the US, the academic community has fared only marginally better. For instance, many in Europe, who have long advanced analyses of the formation and implementation of regimes, found themselves backpedaling as they wrestled with the significance of international regimes absent hegemonic participation. The result is that the space for what was considered politically-relevant scholarship has shrunk dramatically; what used to be considered problem solving theory has become so out of touch with political possibility that it has been relegated to the margins of contemporary thought. Put differently, the realm of critical theory has grown tremendously as hitherto reasonable ideas have increasingly appeared radical and previously radical ones have been pushed even further to the hinterlands of critical thought. As we enter the final stretch of the Bush Administration and the waning years of the millennium’s first decade, the political landscape appears to be changing. In the US, a Democratic Congress, environmental action at the municipal and state levels, and a growing sense that a green foreign policy may be a way to weaken global terrorism, enhance US energy independence and reestablish US moral leadership in the world, have partially resuscitated and reenergized environmental concern.3 Worldwide, there seems to be a similar and even more profound shift as people in all walks of life are recognizing the ecological, social and economic effects of climate change, corporations are realizing that environmental action can make business sense, and environmental values in general are permeating even some of the most stubborn societies. The “perfect storm” of this combination is beginning to put environmental issues ªrmly on the world’s radar screen. It seems that a new day is arising for environmentalism and, by extension, Environmental Studies. What role should environmental scholarship assume in this new climate? Specifically, how wise is it to pursue critical Environmental Studies at such an opportune moment? Is it strategically useful to study the outer reaches of environmental thought and continue to reflect on the structural dimensions of environmental degradation when the political tide seems to be turning and problem-solving theorists may once again have the ear of those in power? Is now the time to run to the renewed, apparently meaningful center or to cultivate more incisive critical environmental thought? Notwithstanding the promise of the new environmental moment for asking fundamental questions, many may counsel caution toward critical Environmental Studies. The political landscape may be changing but it is unclear if critical Environmental Studies is prepared to make itself relevant. Years of being distant from political influence has intensified the insularity and arcane character of critical environmental theory, leaving the discipline rusty in its ability to make friends within policy circles. Additionally, over the past few years, the public has grown less open to radical environmental ideas, as it has been fed a steady diet of questioning even the basics of environmental issues. Indeed, that the Bush Administration enjoyed years of bulldozing over environmental concern without loud, sustained, vocal opposition should give us pause. It suggests that we should not expect too much, too soon. The world is still ensconced in an age of global terror; the “high” politics of national security and economic productivity continue to over-shadow environmental issues; and the public needs to be slowly seasoned to the insights and arguments of critical theory before it can appreciate their importance—as if it has been in the dark for years and will be temporary blinded if thrown into the daylight too soon. From this perspective, so the logic might go, scholars should restrict themselves to problemsolving theory and direct their work toward the mainstream of environmental thought. Such prudence makes sense. However, we should remember that problemsolving theory, by working within existing paradigms, at best simply smoothes bumps in the road in the reproduction of social practices. It solves certain dilemmas of contemporary life but is unable to address the structural factors that reproduce broad, intractable challenges. Problem-solving theory, to put it differently, gets at the symptoms of environmental harm rather than the root causes. As such, it might slow the pace of environmental degradation but doesn’t steer us in fundamentally new, more promising directions. No matter how politically sensitive one wants to be, such new direction is precisely what the world needs. The last few years have been lost time, in terms of fashioning a meaningful, global environmental agenda. Nonetheless, we shouldn’t kid ourselves that we were in some kind of green nirvana before the Bush Administration took power and before the world of terror politics trumped all other policy initiatives. The world has faced severe environmental challenges for decades and, while it may seem a ripe time to reinvigorate problem-solving theory in the new political climate, we must recognize that all the problem-solving theory of the world won’t get us out of the predicament we’ve been building for years. We are all familiar with the litany of environmental woes. Scientists tell us, for example, that we are now in the midst of the sixth great extinction since life formed on the planet close to a billion years ago. If things don’t change, we will drive one-third to one-half of all species to extinction over the next 50 years.4 Despite this, there are no policy proposals being advanced at the national or international levels that come even close to addressing the magnitude of biodiversity loss.5 Likewise, we know that the build-up of greenhouse gases is radically changing the climate, with catastrophic dangers beginning to express themselves and greater ones waiting in the wings. The international community has embarked on signiªcant efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions but no policies are being debated that come even close to promising climate stabilization—including commitments to reduce the amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP, as advanced by the US government, and to reduce GHG emissions globally by 5 percent below 1990 levels, as specified by the Kyoto Protocol. Scientists tell us that, to really make a difference, we need reductions on the order of 70–80 percent below 1990 levels.6 Such disconnects between high-level policy discussions and the state of the environment are legion. Whether one looks at data on ocean fisheries, fresh water scarcity or any other major environmental dilemma, the news is certainly bad as our most aggressive policies fall short of the minimum required. What is our role as scholars in the face of such a predicament? Many of us can and should focus on problem-solving theory. We need to figure out, for example, the mechanisms of cap and trade, the tightening of rules against trafficking in endangered species and the ratcheting up of regulations surrounding issues such as water distribution. We should, in other words, keep our noses to the grindstone and work out incremental routes forward. This is important not simply because we desperately need policy-level insight and want our work to be taken seriously but also because it speaks to those who are tone-deaf to more radical orientations. Most of the public in the developed world apparently doesn’t like to reflect on the deep structures of environmental affairs and certainly doesn’t like thought that recommends dramatically changing our lifestyles. Nonetheless, given the straits that we are in, a different appreciation for relevance and radical thought is due—especially one that takes seriously the normative bedrock of our discipline. Critical theory self-consciously eschews value-neutrality and, in doing so, is able to ask critical questions about the direction of current policies and orientations. If there ever were a need for critical environmental theory, it is now— when a thaw in political stubbornness is seemingly upon us and the stakes of avoiding dramatic action are so grave. The challenge is to fashion a more strategic and meaningful type of critical theory. We need to find ways of speaking that re-shift the boundary between reformist and radical ideas or, put differently, render radical insights in a language that makes clear what they really are, namely, the most realistic orientations these days. 4. Wilson 2006. 5. Meyer 2006. 6. Kolbert 2006. Realism in International Relations has always enjoyed a step-up from other schools of thought insofar as it proclaims itself immune from starry-eyed utopianism. By claiming to be realistic rather than idealistic, it has enjoyed a permanent seat at the table (indeed, it usually sits at the head). By analogy, problem-solving theory in Environmental Studies has likewise won legitimacy and appears particularly attractive as a new environmental day is, arguably, beginning to dawn. It has claimed itself to be the most reasonable and policyrelevant. But, we must ask ourselves, how realistic is problem-solving theory when the numbers of people currently suffering from environmental degradation—either as mortal victims or environmental refugees—are rising and the gathering evidence that global-scale environmental conditions are being tested as never before is becoming increasingly obvious. We must ask ourselves how realistic problem-solving theory is when most of our actions to date pursue only thin elements of environmental protection with little attention to the wider, deeper and longer-term dimensions. In this context, it becomes clear that our notions of realism must shift. And, the obligation to commence such a shift sits squarely on the shoulders of Environmental Studies scholars. That is, communicating the realistic relevance of environmental critical theory is our disciplinary responsibility. For too long, environmental critical theory has prided itself on its arcane language. As theoreticians, we have scaled the heights of abstraction as we have been enamored with the intricacies of sophisticated theory-building and philosophical reflection. In so doing, we have often adopted a discourse of high theory and somehow felt obligated to speak in tongues, as it were. Part of this is simply the difficulty of addressing complex issues in ordinary language. But another part has to do with feeling the scholarly obligation to pay our dues to various thinkers, philosophical orientations and so forth. Indeed, some of it comes down to the impulse to sound unqualifiedly scholarly—as if saying something important demands an intellectual artifice that only the best and brightest can understand. Such practice does little to shift the boundary between problemsolving and critical theory, as it renders critical theory incommunicative to all but the narrowest of audiences. In some ways, the key insights of environmentalism are now in place. We recognize the basic dynamic of trying to live ecologically responsible lives. We know, for example, that Homo sapiens cannot populate the earth indefinitely; we understand that our insatiable appetite for resources cannot be given full reign; we know that the earth has a limit to how much waste it can absorb and neutralize. We also understand that our economic, social and political systems are ill-fitted to respect this knowledge and thus, as social thinkers, we must research and prescribe ways of altering the contemporary world order. While we, as environmental scholars, take these truths to be essentially self-evident, it is clear that many do not. As default critical theorists, we thus need to make our job one of meaningful communicators.We need to find metaphors, analogies, poetic expressions and a host of other discursive techniques for communicating the very real and present dangers of environmental degradation. We need to do this especially in these challenging and shadowy times. Resuscitating and refining critical Environmental Studies is not simply a matter of cleaning up our language. It is also about rendering a meaningful relationship between transformational, structural analysis and reformist, policy prescription. Yes, a realistic environmental agenda must understand itself as one step removed from the day-to-day incrementalism of problem-solving theory. It must retain its ability to step back from contemporary events and analyze the structures of power at work. It must, in other words, preserve its critical edge. Nonetheless, it also must take some responsibility for fashioning a bridge to contemporary policy initiatives. It must analyze how to embed practical, contemporary policy proposals (associated with, for example, a cap-and-trade system) into transformative, political scenarios. Contemporary policies, while inadequate themselves to engage the magnitude of environmental challenges, can nevertheless be guided in a range of various directions. Critical Environmental Studies can play a “critical” role by interpreting such policies in ways that render them consonant with longer-range transformative practices or at least explain how such policies can be reformulated to address the root causes of environmental harm. This entails radicalizing incrementalism—specifying the relationship between superstructural policy reforms and structural political transformation.

### Giroux

**Giroux fails – essentializes violence**

**Gur-Ze’ev** **98** (Ilan, (Haifa University) “Toward a non-repressive critical pedagogy.” No date. Accessed 1/19/11. <http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html>)

The postmodern and the multicultural discourses that influenced Giroux took a one-dimensional attitude towards power. They denoted the importance of deconstructing cultural reproduction and the centrality of relations of dominance to the “voices” of groups whose collective memory, knowledge, and identity were threatened or manipulated by power relations and knowledge conceptions that reflect and serve the hegemonic groups. Freire is not aware that this manipulation has two sides, negative and a positive. The negative side allows the realization of violence by guaranteeing possibilities for the successful functioning of a normalized human being and creating possibilities for men and women to become more productive in “their” realm of self-evidence. Their normality reflects and serves this self-evidence by partly constituting the human subject as well as the thinking self. Giroux easily extracted from Freire’s Critical Pedagogy the elements denoting the importance of acknowledging and respecting the knowledge and identity of marginalized groups and individuals. In fact, this orientation and its telos are in contrast to the central concepts of postmodern educators on the one hand and Critical Theories of Adorno, Horkheimer, and even Habermas on the other. But many similar conceptions and attitudes are present as well.The aim of Freire’s Critical Pedagogy is to restore to marginalized groups their stolen “voice”, to enable them to recognize identify, and give their name the things in the world. The similarity to postmodern critiques is already evident in his acknowledgment that to correctly coin a word is nothing less than to change the world.(10)  However, to identify this conception with the postmodern stand is a over-hasty because the centrality of language in Freire‘s thought relates to his concept of “truth” and a class struggle that will allow the marginalized and repressed an authentic “voice”,(11)  as if their self-evident knowledge is less false than that which their oppressors hold as valid. Implicitly, Freire contends that the interests of all oppressed people are the same, and that one general theory exists for deciphering repressive reality and for developing the potentials absorbed in their collective memory. An alternative critique of language which does not claim to empower the marginalized and the controlled to conceive and articulate their knowledge and needs on the one hand, and is not devoted to their emancipation on the other, is mere “verbalism”, according to Freire.(12)

**Giroux fails – only considers the spoken and rational**

**Gur-Ze’ev** **98** (Ilan, (Haifa University) “Toward a non-repressive critical pedagogy.” No date. Accessed 1/19/11. <http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html>)

This can be exemplified by the issue of dialogue as a manifestation of Critical Education. The Critical Pedagogies of Freire, Giroux, Shor, and Burbules are constituted on education for a critical dialogue between educators and educated that is committed to demolishing hierarchies and power relations,(60)  within which students are empowered (ideally) to the degree of being able to decipher the hidden codes, power relations, and manipulations that build and represent reality, knowledge, and identities. Basically, this concept of dialogue is part of the modernistic emancipatory project. The subject taking part in such an anti-violent dialogue is supposed to be rational and solidarian to the degree of being able to reconstruct reality and understand it within the process of the dialogue, even if the “understanding” here is not conceived as “objective truth” or a representation of “the thing in itself and for itself”. This conception consensus is deconstructed by postmodern critique and is negated by Critical Theory’s understanding of our historical situation. According to this argument, in our historical situation, even as an ideal, there is no place for such a subject whose assumed existence preconditions Critical Pedagogy’s concept of dialogue. That is one reason why Critical Theory has no room for such an optimistic emancipatory concept. In these versions of Critical Pedagogy even the hermeneutic dimension, to which praxis education is implicitly committed, is not represented as it is: a project whose foundations and practice are both within the framework of high culture as in the philosophy of Hans Gadamer, but as an open possibility of the given reality.

**Their uncritical acceptance of marginalized voices dooms their pedagogy to failure**

**Gur-Ze’ev** **98** (Ilan, (Haifa University) “Toward a non-repressive critical pedagogy.” No date. Accessed 1/19/11. <http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html>)

From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by Critical Pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of “feelings”, “experience”, and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical Pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment’s emancipatory and  ethnocentric arrogance, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education. This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function “successfully”. However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. “Truth” is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of “difference” take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that the marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of the weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationalism, and ethnocentrism declines into uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge, which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting “the truth”, “the facts”, or “the real interests of the group” - even if conceived as valid only  for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on “facts” of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.

### 2NC Solipsism Disad/ Defense of USFG

#### Only using the federal government as the actor of change avoids egocentric politics that severs the public sphere

Levasseur and Carlin ‘1 (David G. Levasseur is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Diana B. Carlin is Professor of Communication Studies and Dean of the Graduate School and International Programs at the University of Kansas, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (2001) 407-43, Muse, 2001)

Citizens in our discussion groups frequently framed arguments in terms of their own individual self-interest. For instance, one group participant in Nashville, Tennessee, remarked, "One of my concerns that really has not been brought up here and very little there is military spending. Being retired military and going to school on military benefits, that's a big concern." 28 Similarly, a citizen in North Dakota defined herself as a "single parent" and went on to argue: "I think they really need to address what they can do to help the single parents get through a month on their budget or get through so they can put their kids through college." A group member in San Francisco advocated more governmental attention to Planned Parenthood because "Planned Parenthood is another one, these social programs that I need. I go to that; I need that." All of these arguments are grounded in the egocentric warrant that if a policy affects the individual, then this policy demands political attention. According to some scholars, such arguments should not take place in the public sphere because the "public" nature of this sphere imposes certain rhetorical constraints upon citizens. Habermas's conception of the public sphere includes the belief that "there are certain arguments that simply cannot be stated publicly. In a [End Page 411] political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good for oneself." 29 Expressing similar sentiments, Hauser argues that within the public sphere participants must "forge links" with others or they run the risk of having their views "reduced to the status of a special interest." 30 In other words, since rhetoric involves finding common ground, the public sphere should constrain citizens' ability to offer arguments warranted exclusively upon individual self-interest. Nevertheless, participants in the study frequently grounded policy arguments explicitly in terms of their own self-interest, and groups did not censure such arguments. Discussion group members certainly could have recognized communal constraints and discussed public policy in more communal terms. In fact, a few communal arguments did find their way into the group discussions. For instance, a citizen in San Francisco chastised the government for "cutting funds to the national parks; they're cutting down forests that we need to breathe. There are so many different things, and none of those things are being discussed, which they really need to be discussed, because they're affecting everyone in the world, not just people in America. They're affecting everyone." In this case, the participant advocated a policy that benefits "everyone" rather than a policy that simply benefits herself. Since group facilitators simply prompted participants with general questions about the debates (for example, Were there any issues of interest that were not discussed during the debate?), there is no reason why group members could not respond in broader communal terms as the woman from San Francisco did with her comments on the environment. Nevertheless, such communal discourse was exceptionally rare in the groups, while arguments grounded in self-interest were overwhelmingly abundant. Pamela Johnston Conover, Stephen T. Leonard, and Donald D. Searing, in their limited focus group study of citizenship, found that individuals have great difficulty discussing the "common good." 31 Robert N. Bellah et al. similarly concluded from their citizen interviews that "the concept of common good" is becoming "ever harder to specify in a world where individuals mainly" seek "their own private good." 32 Paralleling these findings, citizens in our nationwide citizen groups were far more likely to evaluate policy positions using an egocentric standard than a common-good standard.

#### The public sphere should constitute a discursive space where individuals transcend the provinciality of their spatiotemporal contexts by focusing on the federal government as the agent of change

Levasseur and Carlin ‘1 (David G. Levasseur is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Diana B. Carlin is Professor of Communication Studies and Dean of the Graduate School and International Programs at the University of Kansas, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (2001) 407-43, Muse, 2001)

While the personal narratives from participants in the study certainly seemed to spark enthusiasm, such engagement came at a significant cost. As with other forms of egocentric argument, narratives that focus on the self are largely unable to steer the conversation towards more transcendent communal outcomes. A group discussion in Ohio reveals this characteristic of personal narratives. In this particular discussion, participants actively debated the issue of whether government should support labor unions: M1: I don't think the unions are going to be wiped out, first of all. And I'm not a proponent of unions. I'm basically anti-union, okay? . . . However, by the same token, unions have got to work the same way in being fair to companies, and I've seen situations where unions, because of some of the things they did, were a disgrace. Perry Power Plant--I know people who were told to go hide--I have nothing to do--go hide. That's WRONG! Okay, I've seen situations where a person, because he's in the union and he has this job classification, then he can't do anything else and he's sitting there for six and a half of his eight hours because he's only needed to do these two things, but he's got to be there because nobody else can do it because the unions state that you've got to have a person to do this and a person to do this and so on. M2: Well, that's his trade though. What do you do? M1: I'm an accountant but I do a lot of other things other than just accounting things. M2: Well, what if somebody came in and tried to take your job--take your livelihood? Something you've trained for, you're second, third generation of this particular . . . M1: Yeah, but I can't be allowed to sit around for six and a half hours out of the eight hours when I could be doing something else but I can't do it because . . . M2: No, that's not my point. [End Page 414] M1: Well, that's my point! If I could do something productive to help the company to help me to help the workers the other six and a half hours, but I'm not allowed to do that because that's not my job classification. Then I'm qualified, I can do it, but I'm not allowed. . . . M2: What about prevailing wage with unions? M1: What do you mean? M2: Well, usually non-union companies are--they gauge their pay scale to union companies with prevailing wage. So if one day, if the prevailing wage with union companies--if it falls and it's gone, then what do you think will happen to the rest of the wages? When the union prevailing wage is wiped out? In this discussion, participants actively debated the issue of whether government should support labor unions; however, they reached no mutual conclusions on the value of labor unions. Divergent opinions were shared, but no attempt at consensus building regarding the role of unions in the economy occurred. Consensus was difficult because when one focuses on self-experience, it is difficult to transcend those experiences. While the conversation raised a number of points on behalf of unions, the anti-union storyteller continued to return to his story. Habermas argues that the public sphere should constitute a discursive space where individuals "transcend the provinciality of their spatiotemporal contexts"--a space where citizens engage in "context transcending validity claims." 39 When citizens ground public policy discussions in personal narratives, they generally fail to transcend the limitations of their personal lives and move to a broader social outlook. It is also interesting to note that in this exchange about unions the personal narrative goes unchallenged. Rhetorical theorists have long recognized that narratives are susceptible to the charge of ungeneralizable evidence. For instance, Richard Whatley observed that one must take care in constructing arguments from examples, because examples are perceived as "exceptions to a general rule" and "will not prove the probability of the conclusion." 40 While such a perception may prove fatal in debates between experts in the technical sphere, they do not seem to have much impact in the deliberative practices of ordinary citizens. In the foregoing exchange, one participant recounted his personal experiences with union workers at the Perry Power Plant. He told the story of union workers who spent endless hours in idleness or in hiding. While one could certainly challenge the generalizability of such a story, the other group members did not offer such challenges. Instead, a pro-union participant shifted the ground of the debate to the alternative issue of "prevailing wage," where the discussion died. Perhaps such personal narratives are difficult to challenge because they establish expertise. Recent scholarly outcry suggests that experts have usurped the public [End Page 415] sphere. 41 Such lamentations are grounded in the fear that technical expertise undermines citizen deliberation by devaluing citizens' views. While this incursion by technical expertise did find its way into the group discussions (citizens citing outside "expert" sources), personally grounded expertise, such as the credibility established in the following exchange from a group in California, appeared far more often: M1: I think they should really look into the military spending. That is just amazing. I was in the military, and it's just a waste. People just rot in the military. It's just amazing how much unnecessary money is used in the military, and how many people that shouldn't have jobs are in the military. M2: That's the Republican job program. M3: I think you can say that about any government organization. In this exchange, a participant recounted his personal experience in the military. With the simple statement, "I was in the military," he established expertise in this realm of public affairs. Just as technical expertise quells discussion, personal expertise has similar effects. In this case, the assertion that "people rot in the military" went unchallenged, and the discussion of military spending quickly came to an end. Such personal credibility may also be less assailable than technical expertise because of its deeply personal nature. Arguments grounded in technical expertise can be challenged for their failure to satisfy certain argumentation standards within a specialized argument field. For instance, a social scientist's findings could be challenged based on a flaw in experimental design. Such a challenge takes issue with the findings; it does not fundamentally take issue with the individual. On the other hand, a challenge to one's lived experience is easily perceived as a challenge to one's life or to one's character. Such challenges can only suggest that one is disingenuous in his or her storytelling or that one's lived experience falls outside the norm. Such challenges seem out of place in a culture grounded in a liberal political tradition that suggests that one should not judge others. 42

#### Default negative- simulations

Levasseur and Carlin ‘1 (David G. Levasseur is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Diana B. Carlin is Professor of Communication Studies and Dean of the Graduate School and International Programs at the University of Kansas, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (2001) 407-43, Muse, 2001)

Since citizen deliberation is a dialogic process, research methods that focus on dialogue are particularly well suited for illuminating this process. Consequently, we adopted a focus group research methodology for this study. The groups were assembled during the 1996 presidential debates as part of a nationwide project called DebateWatch '96. DebateWatch groups provided a rich source of data on the public sphere since participants discussed the debates in an effort to find common ground on issues of importance; groups had to arrive at some consensus on a range of topics. The general group thoughts on these issues were recorded on a form that was submitted to the debate sponsor, the Commission on Presidential Debates, within 24 hours after each debate. Data was collected after each of the presidential debates in Hartford and San Diego, and a smaller set of data was collected from reconstituted groups after the elections. While the entire DebateWatch project involved over eight thousand participants, it also included a substantial number of specifically designated research groups. Communication professionals or leaders in partner organizations assembled participants for these research groups through a variety of recruitment methods ranging from random-digit dialing calls to snowballing techniques to produce 955 participants spread across 56 groups in 18 states. 16 This citizen sample contained substantial demographic and ideological diversity. 17 During the actual group meetings, the facilitators utilized a standard protocol designed to elicit discussions about the debate content and format. 18 These discussions were both recorded and transcribed. Transcripts were analyzed in a three-step process. First, we extracted dialogue centering on domestic policy issues. Following earlier work, we defined domestic policy issues as "vital questions in a presidential election which concern the internal functioning of the United States and which affect, either positively or adversely, a large number of U.S. citizens." 19 We chose to focus upon domestic policy issues because such issues have been of central interest in the study of deliberative democracy and the public sphere. Both of these scholarly traditions focus upon citizen [End Page 409] deliberations on matters of common interest, and citizens' interests generally center upon domestic policy matters. 20 Second, we developed a set of analytic categories to manage the data. Specifically, since this study centered on public policy discussions, we grouped segments of the discussions into distinct public policy areas such as health care, education, welfare, and so forth. Third, we conducted a pattern analysis of these public policy discussions. 21 The literature on the public sphere served as a foundation for this pattern analysis. This literature contains numerous descriptive and prescriptive conceptions of the public sphere. With these conceptions as our guide, we looked for patterns that somehow interfaced with the theoretical accounts of the public sphere. After uncovering a number of prominent patterns, we endeavored to find patterns among the patterns. This latter step led us to the holistic concept of egocentric argument.

### 2NC Citizenship Obligation Disad

#### Using debate as a citizen forum is vital for an effective discourse within communication space – Our privilege as citizens necessitates this obligation

Levasseur and Carlin ‘1 (David G. Levasseur is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Diana B. Carlin is Professor of Communication Studies and Dean of the Graduate School and International Programs at the University of Kansas, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (2001) 407-43, Muse, 2001)

Democracies are built on discourse. As Harold Lasswell expressed several decades ago, "Democracy depends on talk, [and] the methods of talk need to aid in the discovery of sound public policy." 1 Because talk matters, contemporary scholarship has lavished great attention upon civic discourse. The majority of this attention has focused upon diagnosing and rejuvenating the ailing public sphere. While this sphere is defined somewhat differently by individual scholars, in a broad sense this sphere involves "citizens deliberating about common affairs, as distinct from personal or private concerns." 2 Within the expansive literature on the ailing public sphere, theoretical writings far outnumber empirical ones. However, the public sphere is not only a "normative" construct, but it is also a dialogic process subject to "empirical" examination. 3 Gerard A. Hauser has advocated taking an "empirical attitude" to the study of this discursive realm, and he argues that such an empirical "framework draws its inferences about publics, public spheres, and public opinions from actual social practices of discourse." 4 Focusing upon the empirical nature of the public sphere promises to yield valuable insights; just as an ailing patient is best diagnosed by an actual examination, assessing and improving the health of the public sphere is best accomplished through an actual examination of the discourse within this communicative space. [End Page 407] Such empirical examinations should pay particular attention to ordinary citizens' deliberative discourse. After all, democracy is built upon the discursive acts of ordinary people in ordinary conversation. 5 Yet scholars have paid little attention to such ordinary citizens, who, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe." 6 Consequently, our knowledge of the public sphere would benefit from a shift in focus: shifting our

### 2NC Energy SSD Good

#### Switch-side debate is vital for deliberative policy making on energy issues

Stevenson ‘9 (Stevenson, PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, ‘9 (Ruth, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, p. 512-526)

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus. Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69). Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

### Turns Hegemonic/ Energy

#### These skills are necessary to combat *energy* elite technocrats and hegemonic institutions- citizen dialogues over policy making is the bridgeway to the levers of powers and opens up the system as a whole for inclusivity

Hager ’92 (Carol J. Hagel, Professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” Polity, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70, 1992)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

### Turns Accessibility/ Environmental Ethics

#### This enables ACTUAL RESISTANCE and spills up to societal change- technological solutions enable grassroot protest against institutions

Hager ’92 (Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ’92 (Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” Polity, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in decision making diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states. In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions which produced those projects. Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany. In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The technicality of the issue was not a barrier to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the goals of energy policy could be recast and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold. First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest undermined the legitimacy of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

# 1NR

## 2NC Impact Run

#### Fossil fuels are key to global civilization and agricultural productivity- transition away would require massive conversions of land that would destroy the biosphere – we control terminal impact magnitude

#### Collapse of population turns technology and human capital- sustainable progress now

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

How Fossil Fuels Accelerated the Production of Knowledge and Ideas Fossil fuels have been critical for the technologies that allowed humanity’s numbers to increase and its well-being and living standards to advance. But technologies are born from ideas, and fossil fuels have helped increase the quantity and quality of ideas.Population. Without fossil fuels, there would be insufficient food. As a result, the population would be in poorer health, smaller, or both. If lower food production translates into fewer people, then the world would necessarily have fewer ideas. This means less, or inferior, technology. The connection between population and ideas seems intuitive. It is captured in that old adage, “two heads are better than one,” but empirical evidence supporting this idea is difficult to come by. University of California–Los Angeles anthropologists Michelle Kline and Robert Boyd have found evidence of this connection in a novel examination of a “natural experiment” in Oceania. They analyzed marine foraging toolkits for 10 island groups and found that groups with larger populations had more complex and diverse tool kits. Malekula, the smallest island (population 1,100), had 13 total tools, while Hawaii, the largest (population 275,000) had 71. 103 Better Health and Greater Life Expectancy. If, instead of reducing the population level, less food were to result in poorer health, that would compromise the ability to acquire and retain knowledge and training. Human capital per capita would be lowered, which, in turn, would also reduce the quality of its ideas. Better health also translates generally into higher life expectancy, which in and of itself promotes the formation of human capital. Considering that many current candidates for advanced degrees and post-doctoral positions are in their 20s and, in some cases, their 30s and even 50s, 104 had life expectancy not increased—globally it was 25 years in 1750 and 31 years in 1900—there would have been many fewer highly educated and trained people to add to the global stock of knowledge and to train subsequent generations. Moreover, when lifespans are short, it makes less sense for either the individual or society to invest in educating the young and postponing their contribution to society, rather than putting them to work as soon as practicable. After all, the dead cannot produce, no matter how well educated they might become. Thus, higher life expectancy, a consequence of better health, advances human capital and enhances human knowledge, which then generates new ideas and technologies. 105

#### And mechanical power increases human capital- fossil fuels key

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

Mechanical Power. It’s insufficient to have time to acquire human capital, if a person lacks the physical energy to do so efficiently and effectively. Before the Industrial Revolution, much of the work done on the farm and in manufactories at home, in shops, and in industrial settings, required physical labor. (The origin of the term, “manufacture,” itself reveals that it originally required human labor by hand. 110 ) Even where animal power was used, a person usually had to manage and direct the animal’s energy. Consequently, people generally lacked the time and energy for tasks much beyond making ends meet. This changed with the advent of machinery and, later, home appliances powered directly or indirectly by fossil fuels. If not for such home appliances, powered for the most part by electricity, more women would be toiling for longer hours in the home. Most of these technologies would have been stillborn or available only to the wealthy, had relatively cheap fossil fuels been unavailable. These appliances include air conditioning, hot and cold running water, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers, and washing machines. These devices have opened up options for women that seemed absent as recently as a few decades ago, in even the wealthiest countries, particularly for the less well-to-do. In effect, women’s liberation was midwifed by fossil fuels. As a result, women—and their families—have even greater incentive to develop their human capital. Today, more women go on to college and graduate than men in the United States. Currently, women earn 57 percent of bachelor’s, 62 percent of master’s, and 52 percent of doctoral degrees. 111 Therefore, much of this human capital would be lost to mankind were relatively cheap fossil fuels not available. As noted, power tools and machinery have leveled the playing field for women, the disabled, and the weak, enabling them to work on many tasks that were once the domain of able-bodied men. They have also reduced the value of child labor, which is helping make that practice obsolete, except in poor countries where much of the population lacks economic access to such devices. While child labor has declined, the number of children attending school has increased, adding further to the stock of human capital. 112

#### International interactions and global communications- computers

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

Trade. Without relatively cheap fossil fuels, the volume and speed with which goods are traded would be much lower. But trade is one of the fastest methods of disseminating technologies. Introducing new technologies to new places also helps generates new ideas. Or, as Matt Ridley has noted, ideas have “sex,” which then propagates new ideas. 113 Absent trade, such devices as personal computers, notebooks, and cell phones may not have been available outside of a handful of industrialized countries, and their prices would have been higher everywhere. This would translate into lower human capital per capita. These products also contain substantial amounts of polycarbonate and other petroleum-based plastics. 114 The simplification of Tasmania’s toolkit after its isolation from Australia as the result of sea-level rise 10,000 years ago hints at the importance of trade. 115 Kline and Boyd’s natural experiment in Oceania also found that island groups that had more contact—that is, more trade—also had more tools. 116 Trade, in effect, increases the size of the population and human capital from which a society may access ideas and technologies. For instance, because of trade, India’s population can, and does, draw upon ideas and technologies generated in the United States, and vice versa. Trade also encourages specialization, which advances human capital. However, if there is too much specialization and trade (for whatever reason) is then discontinued, that could lead to technological regression. Perhaps that, too, contributed to Tasmania’s technological regression. Communications. The speed and extent of communications are among the stron- gest determinants of the rate of generation of ideas. The major methods of communication over the past few decades, and which are still in broad use (e.g., travel, newspapers, telephones, cell phones, television, the Internet) all currently depend to one degree or another on fossil–fuel energy. Newspapers, for example, are still printed on paper for dissemination. The pulp and paper industry is the second-most energy intensive (Table 2), and despite having ready access to wood, it supplements its energy needs with fossil fuels and electricity (most of which is also from fossil fuels). 117 Television and the Internet all rely on cheap electricity, mainly derived from fossil fuels. Moreover, televisions and the tangible objects at the interface of the Internet and the user (e.g., personal computers, laptops, even cell phones) contain substantial amounts of plastic, which are petroleum-derived products. Detailed analysis of the total energy and fossil fuels used to produce a vintage-2000 desktop computer with a 17-inch cathoderay-tube monitor indicates that computer manufacturing is much more energy intensive than generally recognized. The amount of fossil fuel required to manufacture this desktop system is estimated at 11 times its weight. By comparison, this ratio is 1:2 for automobiles, 2 for refrigerators, and 4:5 for aluminum cans. 118 According to a 2007 estimate, the global information and communications technology industry accounts for approximately 2 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions, which is equivalent to aviation. 119 In 2010, data centers (for servers) alone accounted for 1.3 percent of all electricity use for the world and 2 percent of all electricity use for the United States. 120

#### Key to fertilizer, pesticide, machinery- collapse of global agricultural results in global structural violence

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

Fossil Fuels and the Reduced Dependence on Living Nature Before humanity extricated itself from the restraints that kept its growth and wellbeing in check, it had to develop technologies to reduce its dependence on the direct or indirect products of recent photosynthesis. This was enabled by technologies that either amplified nature’s bounty or bypassed it altogether for a wide variety of products (and services), 23 supplemented by devices or practices that would store today’s products for future use when nature, sooner or later, would fail to deliver. Food. Every activity requires energy. Even human inactivity requires a minimum level of energy to keep basic bodily functions going. 24 The amount of energy needed to sustain this inactivity is called the basal metabolic rate (BMR). It takes food to replace this energy. Insufficient food, which is defined in terms of the BMR, makes populations more susceptible to infections and other diseases, which, ironically, raises the body’s demands for more energy (that is, food). Societies where food supplies are inadequate have high rates of infant and maternal mortality, poor health, and low life expectancies. Thus, consuming sufficient food is the first step to human survival and, beyond that, good health. 25 Increasing food supplies, therefore, was critical to raising humanity’s numbers and well-being. This was initiated with the development of agriculture. Over subsequent millennia, humanity increased the amount of land used for crops and pasture (Figure 2) while also improving agricultural practices to increase yields from both crops and livestock (Figure 3). As shown in Figure 4, the increase in population and improvements in human well-being and living standards commenced before the world started to use fossil fuels in significant amounts. By 1900, an estimated 850 million hectares of cropland were being cultivated to feed a global population of about 1.7 billion people. Since then, although population has quadrupled and the world is much better fed, cropland only increased 80 percent. This was possible because of the technological augmentation of nature’s bounty resulting from tremendous improvements in the productivity of virtually every segment of the food and agricultural sector, from the farmer’s field to the consumer’s fork. Many of these productivity increases were driven directly or indirectly by fossil fuels. 26 Agricultural yields on the farm are driven by fertilizers, pesticides, water, and farm machinery. Each of these inputs depends to some extent on fossil fuels. Fossil fuels provide both the raw materials and the energy for the manufacture of fertilizers and pesticides; farm machinery is generally run on diesel or another fossil fuel; and irrigation, where it is employed, often requires large amounts of energy to operate pumps to move water. To gauge the contribution of fossil fuels to agricultural production, consider that a comprehensive review of fertilizer performance in the Agronomy Journal concluded that the “average percentage of yield attributable to fertilizer generally ranged from about 40 to 60% in the USA and England and tended to be much higher in the tropics.” 27 Another study in Nature Geosciences estimated that, in 2008, fertilizer made from synthetic nitrogen was responsible for feeding 48 percent of the world’s population. 28 As one can see in Figure 3, the acceleration in yields increased around the 1920s, which followed the commercialization of nitrogen fertilizers manufactured via the Haber-Bosch process. This energy-intensive process fixes nitrogen from the air by reacting it under extremely high pressure with hydrogen (obtained from natural gas), generally over an iron catalyst. In recognition of its potential contribution to feeding humanity, the co-inventor of this process, Fritz Haber, received the 1918 Nobel Prize for Chemistry, 29 despite the fact that the same process prolonged World War I by allowing Germany to manufacture explosives and ammunitions even after the British Navy had blockaded its access to Chilean saltpeter, which until then had been critical for its manufacture. (Fritz Haber also pioneered Germany’s wartime poison-gas effort.) 30 The distinguished plant scientist, E. C. Oerke, using data for 2001–03, estimates that 50 to 77 percent of the world’s wheat, rice, corn, potatoes, and soybean crops would be lost to pests in the absence of pesticides. Pesticides have reduced these losses to 26–40 percent. 31 Irrigated lands, with average crop yields 3.6 times higher than rain-fed areas, are responsible for a disproportionately high share of production relative to their acreage. 32 Where irrigation is not accomplished entirely through gravity, it can be a very energy-intensive operation. 33 Similarly, the manufacture and operation of farm machinery requires energy. And in today’s world, energy for the most part means fossil fuels (see below). Beyond increasing yields on the farm, fossil fuels have increased food availability in other ways. The food and agricultural system depends on trade within and between countries to move agricultural inputs to farms and farm outputs to markets. In particular, trade allows food surpluses to be moved to areas experiencing food deficits. But transporting these inputs and outputs in the quantities needed and with the speed necessary for such trade to be an integral part of the global food system depends on relatively cheap fossil fuels. 34 About one-third of the food that is produced is lost or wasted in the food supply chain between the farm and eventual consumption. 35 These losses would have been much higher but for spoilage-reducing technologies such as refrigeration, rapid transport, containers, and plastic packaging. 36 But refrigeration and rapid transport are energy-intensive: plastic, which is ubiquitous in food packaging and storage, is made from petroleum or natural gas, and virtually every container, whether it is made of clay, glass, metal, cardboard, or wood, requires energy to make and shape. These technologies are often overlooked partly because loss and waste are not included in familiar agricultural statistics such as crop yields or production figures. Nevertheless, lower losses and waste increase available food supplies and the overall efficiency of the food and agricultural system. Additional CO2 in the atmosphere should also contribute to higher food production. 37 Although there are uncertainties related to the quantitative relationship between higher yields and higher CO2 concentrations, there is no doubt that the latter increases yield. 38 This is unsurprising since CO2 is plant food, a fact established over two centuries ago by Nicolas Théodore de Saussure in his pioneering book, Recherches Chimiques sur la Végétation. 39 Moreover, because the health of the population has improved, the amount of food needed to maintain a healthy weight for each individual has declined. This is because additional food is needed to replace the nutrients lost because of sickness, with some illnesses (e.g., water-borne diseases) reducing them more than others. 40 Mechanical and electrical appliances have also reduced the demand for human effort, which translates into reduced demand for food. One may get a sense of the cumulative contribution of these technologies to the world food supply if one considers that between 1961 and 2007, global population more than doubled from 3.1 billion to 6.7 billion and food supplies per person increased by 27 percent, yet the total amount of cropland increased by only 11 percent. 41 In effect, in 2007, the global food and agricultural system delivered, on average, two and a half times as much food per acre of cropland as in 1961. New and improved technologies, coupled with greater penetration of existing technologies since 1961, account for 60 percent of total global food supplies. Had the productivity of this sector not improved since 1961, the world would have needed to cultivate another 2.2 billion hectares of cropland in 2007 to produce the same amount of food. This is equivalent to the combined land area of South America and the European Union. Much of this can be attributed directly or indirectly to fossil fuels. However, the full effects of fossil fuels may be even greater because the above calculation does not account for the pre-1961 yield increases from various fossil fuel–dependent technologies identified above. As indicated in Figure 3, the developed world had already captured some of these increases by 1960.

#### Government sectors would collapse- anarchy

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

Service and Government Sectors. Perhaps because people do not see tall chimney stacks billowing steam and smoke from the premises associated with the service and government sectors, it is a common misconception that they do not depend much on energy. But both sectors would grind to a halt without fossil fuels. First, most workers, even in developing countries, go back and forth to work on some form of mechanized transportation. That requires fuel. Second, trade, transportation, and tourism—parts of the service sector—also need fuel to move goods and people. Third, the other segments of these sectors, including the information, finance, education, and government segments, would barely function without reliable electricity for lighting, computers, and telecommunications. The service and government sectors, like other sectors, also usually need heating in winter and air conditioning in summer. But all these depend on energy. And again, worldwide, energy, for practical purposes, means fossil fuels.

## Impact Defense Frontline

#### Group their impact framing arguments- first all clean alternatives fail- renewables would require billions of hectates of land and would destroy global biodiversity

#### Energy use is inevitable its just a question of whether its fossil fuels or trees and animals

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

Thus, fossil fuels have averted a disaster for both humanity and the rest of nature. The movement away from wood, human and animal power, and other renewable energy sources to fossil fuels has also resulted in substantial environmental benefits. An estimated 27 percent of the land harvested in the United States for crops in 1910, for example, was devoted to feeding the 27.5 million horses and mules used on and off the farm. Had the horse and mule population in the United States expanded in proportion to the human population and crop yields stayed constant, an additional 319 million additional acres would have been needed in 1988 just to feed the additional livestock. This would have exceeded the amount of cropland that was harvested in 1988 (about 297 million acres). 67 In fact, phasing out animal power has been among the major reasons why the extent of cropland planted in the United States has not expanded since 1910, despite government subsidies to overcultivate crops. 68 Clearly, fossil fuel–based substitutes for animal power have substantially reduced pressures on habitat and ecosystems in the United States over what they would otherwise have been. 69 This should also be true for much of the rest of the world today. The above estimates understate the reduction in habitat conversion that is the result of fossil fuel’s virtual phase-out of animal power in much of the world because the assumption that it would grow in proportion to the human population ignores the fact that energy use has, in fact, grown much more rapidly (see, for instance, Figure 7). Thus, they do not include estimates of the additional land that would have to be commandeered if fossil fuels were to be replaced by renewable sources of energy and materials using current technologies had energy use stayed constant. Historian Edward Anthony Wrigley estimates that replacing coal in England and Wales in 1850 with wood would have required harvesting 150 percent of all their land. 70 Because fossil fuel energy use is much higher today, the situation would be even worse now, if that is conceivable.

#### Our evidence is comparative

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

Because habitat is critical for maintaining and conserving species and ecosystems, these environmental benefits of fossil fuel– dependent technologies most likely have outweighed their environmental costs resulting from their emissions of air, water, and solid waste. 71 In addition, the environmental damages from converting habitat to cropland is likely to be more lasting and less easily reversed than the damages from air, water, and solidwaste pollution. As the experience of the industrialized world indicates, these damages from fossil fuel combustion can be reversed at relatively reasonable cost. Moreover, if the environmental transition hypothesis is valid, because of the wealth generated from the economic surpluses from the use of fossil fuels, the probability of such reversals is increased.

#### Adaption checks all impacts- development is key to reversing

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

This hypothesis postulates that initially societies opt for economic and technological development over environmental quality because it enables them to escape from poverty and improve their quality of life by making both needs and wants (e.g., food, education, health, homes, comfort, leisure, and material goods) more affordable. But once basic needs are met, over time members of society perceive that environmental deterioration compromises their quality of life and they start to address their environmental problems. Being wealthier and having access to greater human capital, they are now better able to afford and employ cleaner technologies. Consequently, environmental deterioration can be halted and then reversed. Under this hypothesis, technological change and economic development may initially be the causes of negative environmental effects, but eventually they work together to effect an “environmental transition,” after which technological change and economic development become the solutions to reducing these effects.

#### Rapid response capabilities due to fossil fuels checks their impact

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

85 Another important factor, common to all categories of extreme weather events, is better disaster preparedness and more rapid response and delivery of humanitarian aid when disaster strikes. Timely preparations and response are major factors in the reduction in death and disease that traditionally were caused by or accompanied natural disasters. Success (or failure) hinges on the availability of fossil fuels to move out people who are at risk while moving in emergency responders, food, medicine, and other critical humanitarian supplies before and after disasters. Maintaining reliable communications, which depends mainly on electricity, is another critical element of disaster response. This has been aided by improved meteorological forecasts, which rely on electricity-powered communication systems for dissemination. 86 Another critical factor for reducing casualties is the availability of energy-intensive technologies such as air conditioning and heating that allow people to cope with excessive heat and cold. Economic development, itself dependent on fossil fuels, also allowed the United States and other developed countries to accumulate assets such as helicopters, planes, and trucks with which to mount disaster-relief efforts and offer humanitarian aid to developing countries in times of famine, drought, floods, cyclones, and other natural disasters, weather-related or not. Such aid would have been virtually impossible to deliver in large quantities or in a timely fashion absent fossil fuel–fired transportation. 87 In fact, it is inconceivable that a successful and timely disaster-management effort can be mounted today without diesel generators; petroleum-powered helicopters, trucks, earth-moving equipment and other vehicles; heavy-duty tents made of lightweight petroleum-derived synthetic fibers for temporary shelters and hospitals; and myriad other items needed for disaster relief that depend directly or indirectly on fossil fuels.

## AT: Robs Connection to Nature

#### Fossil fuels have cut humanity’s dependency on nature which is good because *nature is scary*

Goklany 12/20 (Indur M. Goklany has worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for 40 years and written extensively on the interactions between globalization, economic development, environmental quality, technological change, climate change, risk analysis, and human well-being. He has published in Nature, the Lancet, Energy & Environment, and other journals. He is the author of several books, including The Improving State of the World: Why We’re Living Longer, Healthier, More Comfortable Lives on a Cleaner Planet and The Precautionary Principle: A Critical Appraisal of Environmental Risk Assessment, “Humanity Unbound How Fossil Fuels Saved Humanity from Nature and Nature from Humanity”, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa715.pdf>, December 20, 2012)

Reduction in the Vulnerability of Society to Climate and Weather Another inevitable consequence of reducing humanity’s dependence on nature and relying instead on fossil fuels and inorganic materials is that climate and weather are no longer critical to humanity’s wellbeing. No human activities are more sensitive to climate and weather than agriculture and forestry. Agriculture, by itself, was mankind’s major economic activity until the Industrial Revolution. But because of economic and technological development and the growth of the service sector—driven in large part by greater energy use underwritten mainly by fossil fuels—this is no longer the case. In 1800, about 80–90 percent of the U.S. working population was engaged in agriculture. This had dropped to 41 percent by 1900, 16 percent by 1945, and today it is 1.5 percent. 78 This shrinkage occurred despite the increase in agricultural production because other sectors grew more rapidly. In 1900, agriculture accounted for 23 percent of U.S. gross domestic product; today it accounts for 0.7 percent. 79 Thus, the United States has become much less dependent on—and, therefore, less vulnerable to—the climate and weather for its well-being. By the same token, climate change, which should be distinguished from “climate,” is itself of lesser importance. This is also true worldwide: the same dynamic is operating in other countries. Table 3 shows that agriculture’s share of gross global product is declining worldwide and for every income group. 80 That is, the world has become more immune to climate and weather. Other fossil fuel–dependent factors have accelerated these trends. In particular, the increase in trade in agricultural products means that if an area experiences a shortfall of food, either because its productivity has always been low or it has been depressed because of weather (or manmade events such as poor agricultural policies or conflict), food shortfalls can be made up via trade. 81 The same factors have also reduced the economic significance of the forestry sector. Currently, about 0.4 percent of the world’s labor force and 1 percent of global economic product depends on forestry. 82 Humanity’s reduced susceptibility to weather and climate is confirmed by the long-term decline in aggregate global mortality from extreme weather events, including droughts, extreme heat and cold, floods, landslides, waves, wildfires, and storms of all kinds (e.g., hurricanes, cyclones, tornados, and typhoons). Despite much more complete reporting of such events and associated casualties, aggregate mortality declined by 93 percent since the 1920s. 83 These reductions were mainly due to fewer deaths from droughts, which accounted for almost 60 percent of the deaths from all extreme weather events recorded globally from 1900 to 2010 and, to a lesser extent, from floods (which accounted for 34 percent) and storms (which accounted for 7 percent). Fossil fuels were critical to these reductions. 84 Specifically, deaths from droughts were reduced by 99.98 percent since the 1920s because thanks to fossil fuels the food and agricultural system produced more food and improved its ability to transport and distribute this food rapidly and in large quantities.

## Turns Developing Nations

#### Democratic control means that we focus on our communities over others which leads to the destruction of developing nations

Levi ’13 (Michael Levi, Michael Levi is the David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the forthcoming book The Power Surge: Energy, Opportunity, and the Battle for America's Future, Foreign Policy Magazine, “The Other Resource Curse”, February 7, 2013)

Moving away from fossil fuels could be devastating for some of the world's poorest countries. For as long as people have talked about moving beyond fossil fuels, another tantalizing prospect has hovered over the horizon: the decline of resource-rich authoritarian countries and the rogue nonstate actors that depend on them. A world of reduced demand for coal, oil, and gas is a world in which Iran, Russia, and various al Qaeda supporters are significantly weakened. That would certainly qualify as good news. But visiting Mozambique last week, I was reminded that not all of the losers from lower fossil-fuel demand will be the traditional bad guys. Mozambique's economy has tripled in size in the decade since the end of the country's 15-year-long civil war, but GDP per capita remains barely over $1,000 a head -- and highly concentrated among relatively wealthy elites. Leaders in Maputo, the capital, relied on international aid for 40 percent of the national budget last year. But an end is in sight: Massive coal deposits and offshore natural gas are poised to end Mozambique's aid dependence and rapidly increase economic output. The most bullish projections are far from assured -- Mozambique suffers from a lack of skilled labor, regulatory capacity, and essential infrastructure. But perhaps the biggest unknown is demand for what the country hopes to sell. If the world were to sharply reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, appetite for Mozambique's exports would decline or vanish, likely leaving the country in considerably worse shape. Mozambique is hardly the only country that would face this predicament. Africa in particular is packed with countries for which resource extraction appears to be the only viable first rung on the road to economic growth. Others in Central and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the South Pacific confront similar prospects. Some plan to sell oil, gas, or coal. Others foresee extracting minerals like iron ore and bauxite, the processing of which requires massive amounts of fossil fuels. In a carbon-constrained world, however, consumers would need to cut back on their use of these minerals. Resource wealth is, of course, far from a guarantee of prosperity. Indeed, it can often bring the opposite: corruption, violence, and economic distortions that crowd out manufacturing and other industries, often deepening inequality in the process. But save for a few lucky countries like Costa Rica that have become favorite tourist destinations, there are few alternatives to resource extraction for many of the poorest developing countries. Development economist Paul Collier argues this point well in his powerful 2010 book, The Plundered Planet. The best alternative to suffering the resource curse, he explains, isn't necessarily forgoing resource development. It's harnessing revenues from resource extraction more effectively for broad and sustainable social and economic good. But while a great deal of effort has been expended looking at how low-carbon development could work in resource-consuming developing countries, very little time has been spent considering what it would look like for resource-rich developing countries. Entire careers are spent devising ideas for how China could power its economy using nuclear energy and renewable fuels, or how India could boost its resource efficiency. Not so when it comes to the travails of resource-rich countries. Many rightly mock demands for compensation from of the likes of Saudi Arabia, which would be hurt by reduced oil exports, but few stop to think about others that would suffer.

## a/t: k the way it’s created

we’ve impact turned the transition – the aff’s slow transition just means it takes longer for them to solve – this is an impact turn to their method

our ev is predictive – transition away destroys the good things fossil fuels have done

1ac cx said they endorse renewable energy – clear link

## Elite control

**Community control fails at causing effective democracy**

**1 – elite domination – letting everyone have a say includes evil people who will manipulate the process – that’s lane**

2 – renewable energy is tough to build – platforms have huge upfront capital costs that poor communities cant pay for – communities don’t have the knowledge to repair a solar panel if it breaks – that means they opt for things like power purchase agreements, leasing, and third party ownership that sound good at first but let utilities retain control – this turns the aff – the utilities will continue to dominate and mislead the public – this empirically happened – lots of people on the Eastern coast of the US bought solar panels so that they would have power during blackouts and were surprised when the panels didn’t work during sandy – only the citizens with the requisite education would be able to escape this which links to the elitism DA – that’s Hoffman and pippert

**Energy decentralization turns all the benefits of environmental governance-**

**First is externalities**

Fortney ‘06 [Matthew D. is an environmental attorney who specializes in “green buildings” and sustainability issues, “DEVOLVING CONTROL OVER MILDLY CONTAMINATED PROPERTY: THE LOCAL CLEANUP PROGRAM,” Summer, 100 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1863 ]

1. **Externalities**. - Many pollution problems **migrate across political boundaries**. For example, a coal-fired power plant located in Illinois emits air pollution that contributes to acid rain over the Adirondacks; a municipal wastewater treatment plant in Chicago releases pollution that eventually flows into the Mississippi and contributes to the "dead zone" in the Gulf of Mexico. n227 If regulation were left to the states, the **costs of these harms might not be internalized**. States would not have to "bear the full cost of their decisions regarding the regulation of their pollution." n228 Decisions regarding activity levels and pollution control that are made without this information will necessarily lead to inefficient results.

**Second is race to the bottom-**

Fortney ‘06 [Matthew D. is an environmental attorney who specializes in “green buildings” and sustainability issues, “DEVOLVING CONTROL OVER MILDLY CONTAMINATED PROPERTY: THE LOCAL CLEANUP PROGRAM,” Summer, 100 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1863 ]

2. **The Race to the Bottom**. - The cost of production is directly proportional to the level of environmental regulations that are in place. More stringent environmental standards consume more resources to implement than do laxer standards. **If states compete to attract businesses** to locate within the state, **states may make strategic decisions to lower environmental standards in an effort to attract economic development**. If this strategic behavior leads an individual state to lower environmental standards below what it would if it were acting in cooperation with all the competitors, there is a race to the bottom. n247 Professor Richard Stewart, who is widely credited as first articulating this concern in an environmental context, n248 describes the Prisoner's Dilemma as follows: Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards. If each locality reasons in the same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if there were some **binding mechanism** that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or development.

**Third is corruption**

Fortney ‘06 [Matthew D. is an environmental attorney who specializes in “green buildings” and sustainability issues, “DEVOLVING CONTROL OVER MILDLY CONTAMINATED PROPERTY: THE LOCAL CLEANUP PROGRAM,” Summer, 100 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1863 ]

3. **Regulatory Capture**. - Regulatory capture occurs when policymakers are disproportionately influenced by parties with concentrated interests in an issue. n256 Capture creates policies that are skewed to benefit the parties that exerted influence over the process. n257 In the environmental context, "regulated entities are expected to achieve this disproportionate influence over officials because they likely will be fewer in number and hence have lower costs of acting collectively, and greater monetary interests at stake, than will the usually more dispersed beneficiaries of a political initiative." n258 When the cost of compliance with a regulation is concentrated and the benefits of the regulation are diffuse, those bearing the cost of compliance may have greater incentive to attempt to change the regulation. n259 Compliance with environmental regulations costs money. As one commentator noted, "it does cost something (actually a lot) to clean the environment; if it did not, we would not have pollution problems." n260 For example, one estimate puts the cost of completing all CERCLA cleanups at $ 750 billion. n261 With this kind of money in the balance, industry interest in CERCLA is clear; industry may find it much cheaper to hire lobbyists and influence the political process in an effort to minimize the costs of compliance. The counterbalance to this effort must come from the regulators themselves or from organized environmental groups. In this context, many argue that **a larger, centralized governing body is better situated to resist regulatory capture**. This argument is based on three primary assumptions: the larger the jurisdiction, the less influence any one actor can command; environmental groups can better organize and amass resources on a larger stage; and finally, federal decision-making is more transparent and more susceptible to judicial review. n262 States are often viewed as less powerful than industry: Very often ... the states simply cannot take on a major industry. The industry can throw enormous resources and essentially wear the state down to the point where a twenty-four year old kid straight out of school who is tasked with fighting the thirty industry lawyers simply cannot muster the attention and will to take them on. The imbalance between power and between technical and scientific expertise and resources is so enormous that **it's a real impediment to** really **delegating things** very often at the state level.

**Centralized environmental governance is more stabilizing- solves resource imbalances and special interest clientelism**

**Faure et al ’10** [Michael G. Faure is professor of law at Maastricht University, Morag Goodwin is Assistant Professor, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology and Society (TILT), School of Law, Tilburg University, and Franziska Weber is Ph.D. candidate within the European Doctorate on Law and Economics program, Rotterdam Institute of Law & Economics, “Bucking the Kuznets Curve: Designing Effective Environmental Regulation in Developing Countries,” Fall 2010, 51 Va. J. Int'l L. 95]

To sum up, **several considerations point toward centralized decision-making**, although others are more ambiguous. First, where the resources available within a given country are limited, centralizing decision making is generally the **most cost-effective** option. Second, the relative strength of the relevant authorities and hence their ability to enforce their will on private actors must be considered. It [\*152] is more likely that the willpower to rein in powerful industry will be stronger at the central level, where the direct influence of a given industry will be less acute, than in localities in which the industry is the **main source of employment**. Third, the relative strength of authorities will depend upon the levels of **corruption** in each locality. The relative levels of corruption, in turn, will depend on the situation in a given country and cannot be predicted by theoretical analysis, but requires a detailed analysis of the forms and prevalence of corruption at the various levels of governance. Finally, the efficacy of legislation that affects local interests and depends upon local people for monitoring and enforcement requires legislation that takes their needs into account. This suggests that the location of decision making should be as close to those it affects as possible in order to facilitate their participation, but not at the risk of undermining the effectiveness of the regulation. However, it should not be assumed that all local people have the same interests; weighing the alternatives should therefore take into account where the interests of the local elite are likely to differ from those of the poorest in the community. A balance needs to be struck between all the relevant factors, and where a choice is made for decision making at the central level, efforts should be made to ensure local interests are well represented in the process, wherever it is located.